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CHAPTER 1:  
 
 
Introduction 
Contrary to the assumptions of neoclassical game theory, recent research found reciprocal 
preferences to matter in laboratory experiments. With this work I want to contribute evidence 
that such experimentally found preferences are in fact applicable to the real world of work. To 
do this, I merge experimental data with personnel and operational data of the same 
employees. 
A basic and fundamental assumption of neoclassical economic game theory is that every 
player is acting according to strictly selfish preferences.1 This simple assumption helps us to 
understand economic interrelations, like the competition between firms, the price mechanism 
of goods and labour markets. However, for many years, researchers voiced doubts about its 
general applicability to all aspects of the economy.2 These doubts where not just based on 
ethical considerations but also on experimentally observed behaviour: People tend to reward 
the kind and punish the unkind actions of other people even if no future economic benefit can 
be achieved. Famous experimental examples that detect such behaviour are gift-exchange and 
ultimatum games:3 In the gift exchange game, Player One may give money to Player Two and 
the transfer is doubled by the experimenter. Player Two may then return money to Player One 
and the return-gift is doubled again. Even though a strictly selfish Player Two would never 
return a gift, many players do so, which has been interpreted as a clear sign of positive 
reciprocal preferences. In the ultimatum game Player One has to divide a pot of money. 
Thereafter Player Two can either accept or reject the division. If he accepts, both players 
                                                 
1 Already Adam Smith (1776) wrote: “It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that 
we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but 
to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages.” 
2 For an overview see e.g. Fehr and Schmidt (1999). 
3 See e.g. Falk and Fischbacher (2003). 
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receive their shares, if not both players earn nothing. Even though it would be rational for 
Player Two to follow strictly selfish preferences and accept any division, many unfair 
divisions are rejected, which has been interpreted as a clear sign of negative reciprocal 
preferences. 
As a consequence, many researchers adapted economic theories to match these experimental 
observations.4 As a next step it is all the more important to find out to what extent these 
recent theoretical adoptions are applicable to the economic world outside the labor
Contributing such evidence is the goal of this work. 
As the “economically odd behaviour” mostly appears when personal contacts in prolonged 
relationships are observed (Gachter and Fehr, 1999; Goette, Huffman and Meier, 2006), I 
focus on internal labour market relations, in which employers and employees interact over 
time. The important question is whether positive and negative reciprocal preferences play a 
role in this relationship and whether experiments can predict such behaviour. 
But researching reciprocal behaviour outside the laboratory is difficult, because concerns for 
reputation and repeated interactions cloud positive and negative reciprocal preferences:5 
When workers reward high wages by high effort levels, this seems like positive reciprocity. 
But this behaviour may also be motivated by purely selfish preferences: When nobody wants 
to employ somebody who is known for taking advantage of others, employees tend to mimic 
positive reciprocal behaviour in order to keep their job.6 
For the case of negative reciprocity, repeated interactions are just as crucial: Even if one 
might perceive a strike to be motivated by negative reciprocity, especially if it is costly for 
employees with piece-rate contracts, these employees may just follow strictly selfish 
preferences for better wages in the long run. 
To solve the problem of indistinguishable selfish and reciprocal preferences I tread a new path 
of research: I start in chapter two by conducting experiments with employees. In chapter three 
I then empirically analyse the reciprocal behaviour of the same employees in a real employer-
employee situation where reputation may not be at stake. Finally, in chapter four, I combine 
the experimental data with the empirical data. Doing so I validate if in fact reciprocal 
 
4 For an overview see e.g. Sobel (2005).  
5 See e.g. Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Fehr and Gachter (2000a), Brown, Falk and Fehr (2002) or Camerer and 
Fehr (2002). 
6 For an early version of these thoughts see e.g. Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984). 
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behaviour plays a role in the relationship of employers and employees and whether a 
laboratory experiment is able to predict real-life behaviour.7 
By performing experiments with employees in chapter two, I not only gather the crucial data 
for the final analysis of chapter four, but I also research whether an employer is willing and 
able to recruit, train or socialize its workforce in regard to reciprocity to match his particular 
work environment. The more that is at stake and the harder it is to supervise a workforce, the 
more beneficial positive reciprocity becomes for employees to efficiently work as a team. If 
this is the case, reciprocity may be relevant for recruiting, training and socialization of 
employees. For such evidence I focus on a special work environment, which is highly team-
sensitive and difficult to supervise in all its aspects. Being a Swiss Air Force pilot myself, I 
was permitted to conduct a typical laboratory experiment during a compulsory training 
workshop for all pilots. The analysis of this experimental data shows higher levels of positive 
reciprocity among pilots compared to the standard student population. According to further 
empirical analyses, it even seems highly probable that this special workforce is much more 
positive reciprocal than the average population. This difference prevails even if the pilots play 
against outsiders. This interesting finding shows that either the recruiting, training or 
socialization of pilots achieved the goal of finally employing highly positive reciprocal team-
players. I derive that reciprocity is important for certain employers influencing their 
recruitment, training and socialization policies. 
To gather more detailed information about the applicability of reciprocity to the labour 
market, in chapter three I search for a real life employer-employee situation, in which only 
reciprocity, and not reputation, matters. In order to find such a situation, I use two unique 
datasets. All pilots of the Swiss Air Force are evaluated annually upon a subjective 
performance evaluation system called "LOBE". Since this system is based on subjective 
performance evaluations, the concerned pilots may regard any improved or deteriorated 
evaluation as a friendly or unfriendly action of a superior. As this might induce a respective 
reciprocal reaction, I look for an activity that would not be relevant for considerations of 
evaluation or reputation. Fortunately there is additional operational data that is unobserved by 
the evaluating superiors due to military regulations. And indeed, the pilots seem to choose 
their unobserved effort levels according to changes in their subjective performance 
 
7 Even though the findings of chapter two and three are important for chapter four, all three chapters are written 
as individual complete research articles.  
 Chapter 
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evaluations. Hence I am able to show that reciprocity matters for the performance of 
unobserved tasks. 
As this apparent reciprocal behaviour may be very important to many employers, the next 
question is, whether it can in fact be associated to reciprocity. To answer that, I generate a 
unique dataset combining not only the subjective performance evaluations with unobserved 
operational data, but also with experimental data for the same individuals. Therefore in 
chapter four I am able to apply a new research method that merges the three datasets to asses 
whether the experimentally assessed individual reciprocity of chapter two predicts the 
individual reciprocal behaviour I empirically find in chapter three. And indeed, the 
experimental findings are able to predict the levels to which the pilots are reciprocating 
positive and negative changes in their subjective performance evaluations. In my opinion, 
these findings born out of such a unique combined dataset may not only be essential for 
experimental researchers, but equally important for employers to improve the efficiency of 
workplace relations. I thus summarize my findings in chapter five and indicate possible 
implications. 
 
 
CHAPTER 2:  
 
 
Cooperation in the Cockpit 
Experimental Evidence of Reciprocity and Trust among 
Swiss Air Force Pilots 
2.1. Introduction 
Voluntary cooperation is important in organisations due to the incomplete nature of contracts. 
Much attention has been devoted to the cooperation between firms and workers (Prendergast, 
1999; Kandel and Lazear, 1992; La Porta et al., 1997; Akerlof and Kranton, 2005). In this 
case the typical problem involves the difficulty to enforce complex contracts to render a firm 
efficient. This issue can often be resolved through repeated interactions, so that a worker’s 
incentive to comply is to profit from future interactions.8 If, in addition to that, a minimal 
fraction of subjects is not purely selfishly motivated, cooperation is enhanced and sometimes 
even possible in one-shot interactions (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Brown, Falk and Fehr, 
2002).9  
In many cases, cooperation between a worker and his fellow worker is just as important for a 
firm as is its efficiency (La Porta et al. 1997). This interaction differs in two important aspects 
from the interaction between a worker and a firm: 
                                                 
8 The effects of reputation can prove efficient (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Fehr and Gachter, 2000a; Brown, Falk 
and Fehr, 2002; Camerer and Fehr, 2002). 
9 Non-purely selfish individuals are commonly modelled by utility functions that include other individuals’ 
actions and payoffs (see e.g. Levine (1998), Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Falk and Fischbacher (2000), Bolton and 
Ockenfels (2000) or Charness and Rabin (2002)). 
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First, the interaction is harder to observe for the firm: It is unlikely to be enforced by 
incentives such as those created through repeated interactions between workers and firms (La 
Porta et al., 1997). Since employees often refrain from reporting an incident to the firm, 
where fellow workers do not cooperate, a worker cannot be disciplined by the fear of loosing 
his job. Hence it is difficult for the employer to establish cooperation among workers. 
Second, social preferences may be more powerful in interactions between workers, because 
workers mostly interact with fellow workers. Therefore they might identify more strongly 
with one another than for example with their principal (Akerlof and Kranton, 2003).  
It follows that firms have to rely on social preferences of their employees to ensure the 
cooperation among their workers. These social preferences can be expressed through positive 
and negative reciprocal behaviour. If such reciprocity is anticipated by other workers, it can 
lead to trust and the cooperation of a whole group (Fehr and Gachter, 2000b; Falk and 
Fischbacher, 2000; La Porta et al., 1997; Carpenter, Burks and Verhoogen, 2005).  
In this chapter, I measure positive and negative reciprocity in a group of subjects for which 
cooperation at work is literally a question of life or death: I conducted a moonlighting game 
with pilots of the Swiss Air Force. While previous studies have shown that workers cooperate 
more than students (Fehr and List, 2004; Carpenter, Burks and Verhoogen, 2005), I examine 
two novel issues: First I study preferences for positive versus negative reciprocity in workers 
when negative reciprocity can have very high costs to the principal. Second I examine the 
robustness of reciprocity to social distance when cooperation is indispensable.  
Starting with the first issue, I argue that in some cases negative reciprocity may bear more 
adverse effects than the efficiency gains achieved by enforced cooperation. In the context of 
aviation, for instance, there are spectacular examples of how negative reciprocity can be 
costly to an organisation: On October 28, 2003, an airliner flew from Leipzig to Zurich. After 
an uneventful smooth flight, suddenly the captain decided to perform the duties of the co-pilot 
in addition to his own. The co-pilot stopped doing his duties almost altogether, because he felt 
himself left out. Consequently, he did not use the proper map to monitor the captain’s 
approach nor did he check the visual references the captain claimed to see on final approach. 
In heavy fog, the aircraft crashed next to the runway due to the captain’s bad judgment. A 
subsequent investigation ruled out any technical failure (AAIB, 2006). Although the aircraft 
was a total loss, on account of pure luck, no one was hurt.  
It can be argued that negative reciprocity played an important role in the occurrence of the 
accident: The co-pilot was unwilling to perform his duties after having been left out by the 
  6
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captain, even though it would have been especially important to assist a captain, who is 
performing the duties of two crewmembers at the same time. Hence it is particularly 
interesting to study if the vital cooperation among pilots is typically established through 
higher levels of positive reciprocity rather than higher levels of negative reciprocity. 
Focusing on my second issue, it can be argued that a further feature may have contributed to 
the detriment in my example: that the captain relied on his rank to relieve the co-pilot of his 
duties. Any identification process between the pilots, which could have lead to stronger 
positive and weaker negative reciprocity, would have been destroyed. Therefore social 
distance, in the form of hierarchy, may further hinder cooperation in such an environment.10 
As cooperation is essential among pilots to remain effective, neither negative reciprocity nor 
social distance should be a critical factor. Hence it is also interesting to study if social 
distance, particularly in the form of hierarchy, influences levels of reciprocity.  
To research the first issue, I compare Air Force pilots and students playing the moonlighting 
game for real money. I find that positive reciprocity is indeed stronger than negative 
reciprocity among pilots compared to students. In addition trust is shown to be dependent on 
the level of expected reciprocity.  
To research the second issue, I first compare positive and negative reciprocity of pilots paired 
with higher-ranking pilots to positive and negative reciprocity of pilots paired with pilots of 
equal rank. I do not find any effect of perceived social hierarchy on actions and reactions of 
pilots and no statistically significant difference in the levels of positive and negative 
reciprocities was detected. 
To further stress the second issue, I test amongst the pilots the general assumption that high 
levels of cooperation among workers are based on a higher degree of group identity similar to 
the studies of Gachter and Fehr (1999) and Goette, Huffman and Meier (2006). The pilots 
were paired with students to investigate pilots’ behaviour towards total outsiders. Surprisingly 
positive reciprocity does not vanish.  
My results suggest differences in basic social preferences between pilots and students. It 
seems tempting to conclude that these differences are achieved through screening, training or 
socialization of the Swiss Air Force.  
                                                 
10 In addition to that, it has been shown that perceived social hierarchy may hinder the optimal performance of 
subjects (Hoff and Pandey, 2006). 
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The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: In section two I provide some details 
about Swiss Air Force pilots. Section three discusses the experimental design and provides the 
predictions. Results are discussed in section four. Finally section five summarizes.  
2.2. Institutional Background 
In order to better understand the screening, training and socialization of Swiss Air Force 
pilots, this section provides background details about their careers.  
Every year the Swiss Air Force picks 6 to12 potential pilots out of hundreds of twenty-year-
old applicants, who, among other criteria, are chosen for their teamwork capabilities (Noser, 
2003; Airforcepilot, 2004).  
To further train cooperation, the applicants have to attend 56 lessons and 3 years of practical 
education in "Crew Resource Management" during pilot school.11 This particular course has 
been developed on the basis of management training and aims to optimise the use of human 
resources in the cockpit (Helmreich, Merritt and Wilhelm, 1999).12 After pilot school, every 
flying officer is required to attend to refresher courses on a regular basis.  
In their work environment, pilots become more socialized because of the heavy dependence 
on each other: Large helicopters are always crewed by two pilots due to their complexity. Jet 
fighters never fly alone to increase efficiency and firepower. A single pilot is unlikely to 
succeed in accomplishing an actual task especially when confronted with an emergency 
situation. Therefore crewmembers must fully cooperate in order to minimize the probability 
of loss of human lives and best accomplish their task.  
For all these circumstances, I view Swiss Air Force squadrons as being a work environment 
where cooperation has high efficiency gains and where screening, training and socialization is 
used to enhance such cooperation.  
                                                 
11 The Commander of Screening & pilot basic training Swiss Air Force provided this information. 
12 It enhances communication, teamwork, situational awareness, decision-making capabilities, leadership and 
stress management (Helmreich, Merritt and Wilhelm, 1999). 
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2.3. Experimental Design 
2.3.1 The Game  
The subjects participated in several moon lighting games (Abbink, Irlenbusch and Renner, 
2000). In this particular game, Player A has the choice of being friendly, neutral or unfriendly 
to Player B. Player B in turn rewards or punishes Player A for his actions. I can learn about 
B’s positive and negative reciprocity when looking at his rewards and punishments. 
Behaviour of Player A may carefully be interpreted as trust. The game is summarized in 
Figure 1. Player A and Player B are each endowed with 20 points at the beginning of the 
game. Player A has to decide whether to pass on 10 points to Player B, not to pass on any 
points, or take 5 points from Player B. The experimenter in any case doubles the transfer. 
Hence, if Player A passes on 10 points, Player B will receive 20 points. Conversely, if Player 
A takes 5 points, Player B will loose 10 points.  
 
Figure 1: Experimental Design: Player A's choices vs. Player B's strategic options. 
 
 
Examples:  - A takes 5, so B looses 10, then B punishes -10, he has to pay 10, so A looses 20. 
 - A gives 10, so B gets 20, then B rewards +10, he has to pay 10, so A wins 20. 
 
Player B can then decide how to respond to Player A's action. Player B can either reward or 
punish Player A. If Player B spends one point on rewarding Player A, Player A will receive 
two points. If Player B spends one point on punishing Player A, Player A will lose two points. 
Player B can use up to ten points for either punishing or rewarding Player A. I apply the 
strategy method for Player B, i.e., Player B makes a choice for each possible case that can 
arise (Player A passing on 10 points, passing on 0 points, or taking 5 points).  
  9
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The sub-game perfect equilibrium with selfish preferences is easy to derive: Player B would 
never use any points to reward or punish, since Player A has already chosen his action. 
Consequently, Player A will maximize his payoff by taking 5 points from Player B (who 
looses 10 points). But behaviour is more interesting when agents have non-selfish 
preferences. Different social preferences can be examined for different players: First, the 
behaviour of Player B can be used to measure reciprocity. Player B can display positive 
reciprocity if he rewards transfers of 10 points relative to a neutral transfer (or if he rewards 
Player A for not taking any points away). Conversely Player B can display negative 
reciprocity if he punishes when Player A takes 5 points from him (or if he punishes Player A 
for not passing on any points). 
Second, Player A’s actions may be considered as trusting behaviour. However, they must be 
interpreted more carefully than in a standard trust game due to the ambiguous role of risk 
preferences. In a standard trust game (e.g. Glaeser et al., 2000; Fehr and List, 2004; Falk and 
Zehnder, 2006), players exhibit trust by transferring positive amounts to Player B. Risk 
aversion reduces transfers of first movers, because this reduces the variance in payoffs. In the 
moonlighting game Player A could also be motivated to pass on 10 points to Player B if he 
fears substantial punishment otherwise. Risk preferences have a more complicated impact on 
Player A's behaviour: A “neutral” action may be risky as well, as it may be rewarded or 
punished. These "outbursts" of reciprocity may create an even larger variance in the payment 
of Player A when he acts “neutral”. Therefore the interpretation of Player A’s actions has to 
be very careful and involve his beliefs concerning Player B’s actions. 
2.3.2 Treatments  
Figure 2 summarizes the different treatments that have been conducted.  
Student-Student Baseline: My control condition that is best comparable to other experiments 
is the Student-Student baseline treatment (referred to as S-S in the remainder of the chapter). 
34 students participated as Players A, and 33 as Players B.13 The students were told that their 
partners in the experiments were other students, not present now. Immediately after their 
choices, I elicited beliefs about the behaviour of their counterparts in the experiment, as I did 
in all treatments.  
Student-Pilot (S-P): In this treatment, the choices of another 58 students as Players A were 
used. They were told that they would be matched with a pilot from the Swiss Air Force as 
                                                 
13 The decision of the 34th player A was randomly assigned to the decision of a player B. 
  10
 Chapter 2: Cooperation in the Cockpit 
Player B. 112 pilots participated in this treatment. The students were informed that their 
choices may be used in multiple matchings, and that they would be paid the total amount they 
earned from all their matchings.14  
Higher-ranking pilots - lower-ranking pilots (H-L): In this treatment, the pilots were assigned 
the roles of A players and B players based on their rank in the Air Force. Pilots with the rank 
of major or above (N = 49) were assigned the role of Player A and were matched with a pilot 
with the rank of captain or below (N = 67).15 Some of the choices of Players A were used 
twice to determine all the payoffs of Players B.  
Pilot-Pilot (P-P): Pilots in this treatments where paired with their peer-group. Lower-ranking 
pilots were paired with lower-ranking pilots, and told so. Similarly, higher-ranking pilots 
were paired with higher-ranking pilots and informed so. 
 
Figure 2: Treatments and Subjects. 
 
 
                                                 
14 As can be seen, a students' choice was used almost exactly twice. 
15 The separation between captains and majors is due to the fact that every squadron member becomes a captain 
after a certain amount of time, while squadron leaders and other superiors hold at least the rank of a major. 
Therefore the working level is represented by the maximum rank of a captain, while superiors are represented by 
the minimum rank of a major.  
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2.3.3 Procedures 
The experiment for the baseline and the first part of the S-P treatment were conducted using 
students of the University of Zurich, who volunteered to participate as subjects of behavioural 
research studies. No economic students were allowed to participate in the sessions to avoid 
economic background bias due to their possible knowledge of game theory (Carter and Irons, 
1991; Frank, Gilovich and Regan, 1993).  
The data for the other treatments were collected on the occasion of a workshop for all Swiss 
Air Force pilots on the subject of "work satisfaction" and "burn out syndromes" on December 
12, 2005. The workshop was compulsory, but a few flight missions could not be cancelled, 
and since the pilots cannot pick and choose whether they fly or attend the workshop, any 
participation bias seems unlikely.16 
The pilots were seated according to their military rank. They were told that they had to make 
decisions and could earn money in doing so. Additionally they were informed that the data 
would be treated anonymously.17 Thereafter the instructions and the decision sheets for the 
S-P treatment were distributed. Treatment H-L and P-P followed while every effort was made 
to ensure the subjects would not speak to each other and never hold more than one decision 
sheet at a time. 
Only after the pilots had finished the last treatment were they issued a closed envelope with a 
copy of the decision sheet of a randomly assigned student to estimate their earnings from the 
S-P treatment. This late distribution of the partners’ decision in the first treatment helped 
preventing a learning effect (Egas and Riedl, 2005). Payments where distributed at the end of 
the day. 
2.3.4 Subject Characteristics 
As former studies have shown, it is very important to obtain social background variables 
when comparing students to other subjects (Bellmare and Kroeger, 2005). Therefore the 
question of whether students can be compared to pilots in an efficient manner mainly depends 
                                                 
16 This would rule out the argument of Lazear, Malmendier and Weber (2005) who found experimental results to 
be biased because people self-select into different settings. 
17 Special care was taken to ensure anonymity as not to endanger the actual team spirit of the pilots involved 
(Carpenter, Burks and Verhoogen, 2005). Furthermore, each subject was informed about his right to tell the 
experimenter not to use his decision-data for behavioural research.  
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on the overlap in the social background variables of the two populations. Table 1 shows the 
statistical means, minima, maxima, standard errors and numbers for pilots and students. 
 
Table 1: Subjects characteristics: Pilots' and students' age, gender and education. 
 Pilots Students 
Variable mean min max sd n mean min max sd n 
age 36.50 23 57 9.960 116 22.32 18 45 3.568 126 
male 0.983 0 1 0.131 116 0.556 0 1 0.499 126 
educ 12.71 12 19 1.552 116 12.5 12.5 12.5 0 126 
Source: own calculations based on experimental evidence from December 2005. 
 
The main difference between the two groups can be found in their mean age; the disparity is 
no less than 24 years. However, the two populations are overlapping, as the youngest pilot is 
23 years old and the oldest student 45. Another difference can be found in the distribution of 
the genders within the two populations. Though there are only four female professional pilots 
in the Swiss Air Force, with only two of them participating in the workshop,18 males were the 
more dominant gender among pilots than among students. As for education19, the difference 
between students and pilots is small: On the one hand, I consider students to hold a high-
school diploma, as this is an entry requirement to university.20 Military pilot applicants, on 
the other hand, are currently required to hold a high school diploma or reach an equivale
educational level.
nt 
                                                
21 
Despite the above discrepancies in mean age and gender, I consider the two groups as 
sufficiently overlapping and therefore assume that statistical tests are not subject to out-of-
sample predictions. 
2.3.5 Behavioural Predictions 
My design allows me to examine in detail how the behaviour of Player B (and to some extent 
of Player A) is affected by the different treatments.  
 
18 One female pilot was actually flying one of the missions that day and so could not attend the experiment. 
Another female pilot was working part-time for the Air Force and by coincidence was off duty on that particular 
day. 
19 Education was coded as theoretical years of education according the highest degree a subject has 
accomplished (see for example Bonjour (1997) or Falter and Ferro (2000)). 
20 No exact data on completed education was available for students. 
21 There are older pilots who have fewer years of schooling and a small group of pilots who have earned a 
university degree. These two groups almost offset each other. 
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The treatment most closely related to the previous literature is S-S: it provides me with the 
baseline measures of social preferences. Evidence from other studies suggest that when one 
controls for social background variables, students become comparable in their social 
preferences to the general public in their social preferences (Gueth, Schmidt and Sutter, 2002; 
Gachter, Herrmann and Thoni, 2004). Bellmare and Kroeger (2005) find that especially age, 
gender and education have significant effects on investments and rewards of a representative 
panel of the Dutch population and that after controlling for social background variables, no 
difference could be found between the representative panel and students. 
Players B 
Comparing the behaviour of Players B in treatment S-S to treatment P-P sheds light on my 
first issue, the preference for positive versus negative reciprocity. It shows the difference in 
social preferences between students and a group of subjects that interacts on a daily basis in 
an environment that yields high efficiency gains from cooperation. 
There is strong evidence from previous studies that social ties between participants strongly 
influence behaviour towards more cooperation (see e.g. Burks, Carpenter and Goette, 2006).22 
Moreover, the scope for cooperation in the work environment of pilots may shape their social 
preferences. This has been suggested by Fehr and List (2004), who show more 
trustworthiness in managers of coffee planting cooperatives than in students.23  
In light of possible negative consequences of negative reciprocity, I predict the following: 
Cooperation among pilots is mainly based on stronger positive instead of stronger negative 
reciprocity. Therefore positive reciprocity is stronger and negative reciprocity is weaker 
among pilots than among students. 
My second focus lies on hierarchy: I compare Player B’s behaviour in P-P to H-L treatment, 
where I match low-ranking pilots with high ranking-pilots.  
It can be argued that ranks between pilots matter, as only pilots of similar rank are similar in 
many dimensions, including age and years of service. Further, similar ranking pilots are more 
likely to interact with each other while performing similar tasks, since the higher-ranking 
                                                 
22 Burks, Carpenter and Goette (2006) find that bike messengers cooperate more as second movers in a 
sequential prisoners' dilemma even to the extend that 30 percent cooperate in spite of defection of the first-
mover. 
23 Holding transfers of the first mover constant, the managers in their experiment return significantly more than 
the student control group. In contrast to the standard trust game that has been applied by Fehr and List (2004), 
my experiment lets me distinguish between positive and negative reciprocity. 
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pilots mostly pursue management duties within the Air Force. Thus, I might expect a higher 
social distance when pilots of "unequal" rank are matched in an experiment. Further evidence 
from Hoff and Pandey (2006) and La Porta et al. (1997) show that social hierarchy can have a 
strong impact on behaviour.  
However, as perceived hierarchy might bear negative externalities in such an environment as 
discussed in the introduction of this chapter, I predict the following: 
Social distance induced by hierarchy does not affect positive and negative reciprocity of 
pilots. 
To finally test whether high levels of cooperation are based on group-specific norms, I 
increase the social distance to a degree of total outsiders. The comparison of P-P treatment vs. 
S-P treatment shows whether pilots' degrees of reciprocity are different when interacting with 
a student rather than with a pilot. There is strong evidence from earlier studies that pro-social 
behaviour is different when individuals interact with someone they perceive to belong to a 
different social group. Most closely related, Goette, Huffmann and Meier (2006) find 
evidence consistent with in-group favouritism when officer candidates in the Swiss Army 
interact with a member of their own platoon relative to when they interact with a member of a 
different platoon.24 Similarly Ruffle and Sosis (2006) find that members of Kibbutzim are 
more cooperative in interactions with member of Kibbutz than with subjects living in 
"normal" cities.25 Fershtman and Gneezy (2001) finally find that subjects' social preferences 
strongly depend on demographic differences to partners in experiments. Hence I predict the 
following: 
When pilots are paired with students positive reciprocity decreases and negative reciprocity 
increases compared to pilots interacting with fellow pilots or superior pilots. 
Player A 
In the case of Player A, I am not only interested in his actions. Beliefs might be important as 
well, as they influence the actions of Player A.26 Trusting behaviour can be explained as 
follows: If Player A believes in a strong positive reciprocity from Player B, he is prone to 
                                                 
24 Bernhard, Fehr and Fischbacher (2006) find similar results for self-selected groups: Members of clans in 
Papua-New Guinea show the same behavioural tendencies when interacting with somebody from their own clan 
relative to interactions with somebody from a different clan. 
25 Further, when Kibbutz members interact with city members, cooperation is at the same level as that of city 
members. 
26 This is due to the fact that for player A, the strategy method could not be applied 
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express more trust by transferring more money to Player B.27 Additionally, in the 
moonlighting game he might be influenced by the fear of negative reciprocity of Player B. If, 
however, his transfer is high in absence of corresponding expectations about Player B’s back 
transfer, his action might be motivated by risk preferences. These are ambiguous as discussed 
in section 2.3.1.. The fact that military pilots have a risk of death, which is at least 60 times 
higher than their student counterparts, could play a role in this case.28 Hence, only if believed 
positive reciprocity is high, a statement in the favour of trust can be made. But even then 
caution has to be exercised when interpreting the results because risk preferences might be 
interacting with the beliefs of Player A.  
The comparison of S-S vs. P-P is used to establish the differences in stated beliefs and actions 
between pilots and students.29 In pursuing the argument for Player B I propose the following: 
Pilots exhibit more trust: They anticipate higher levels of positive reciprocity, believe in 
higher back transfers and thus transfer more than students. 
As a final point I test the effect of in-group favouritism by introducing hierarchy when 
comparing treatment P-P to H-L. One might argue that social distance hinders trust 
(Hoffmann, McCabe and Smith, 1996). However, as cooperation across ranks is essential 
among pilots in the same crew to remain effective, social distance should not be critical for 
the actions of pilots. Hence I predict the following:30 
Beliefs and transfers of Players A remain the same whether pilots are paired with lower 
ranking pilots or with pilots of the same rank.  
                                                 
27 Fehr and List (2004) find higher transfers of first movers in their trust game with managers. In Burks, 
Carpenter and Goette (2006) bike messengers cooperate more as first movers than students in a sequential 
prisoners dilemma. 
28 The mean risk of death for a Swiss worker in 2001 amounts to 0.5 deaths per 10’000 workers. In civil aviation 
it amounts to 1.5 deaths per 10’000 workers (SUVA, 2004). For Swiss Air Force pilots, it amounts to 33 deaths 
per 10’000 pilots each year for the period of 1981 until 2001. During the period of 1941 until 2001 the Swiss Air 
Force had even lost 81.5 pilots to crashes per 10’000 pilots each year. As some of the older pilots among my 
subjects may have based their decision on early statistics, even this number could be claimed representative.  
29 Although I do not have a treatment that introduces experimental variation in beliefs to identify the beliefs' 
effects on behaviour the comparison of pilots and students beliefs can be telling. 
30 As I do not have a P-S treatment (see  on page 11), I cannot test for total strangeness for player A. Figure 2
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2.4. Results  
2.4.1 Comparison of S-S to Previous Literature  
The S-S treatment serves as a benchmark to previous studies with students as subjects. In my 
experiment, the B player punishes negative transfers with 3.6 points, rewards zero transfers 
with essentially zero (0.3) points, and rewards a transfer of 10 points with 5.6 points on 
average. In relative terms, my subjects thus invested 36% of the points they lost into 
punishment and 28% of the points they gained into rewards. The latter figure is strikingly 
close to Abbink, Irlenbusch and Renner (2000), who find a corresponding figure of 26%. 
Evidence in Abbink, Irlenbusch and Renner (2000) points to a slightly stronger negative 
reciprocity than my study, although this could be related to the details of the game.31  
In my base treatment, 14% of players B choose to take 5 points, 27% choose to transfer 
0 points and 59% of players transferred 10 points. In Abbink, Irlenbusch and Renner (2000) 
18.8 % choose a negative amount (12.5% more than half of the possible points), 15.6% 
choose to send 0 points and 65.6% sent a positive amount (43.8% more than half of the 
possible points).32 
2.4.2 Behaviour of Player B  
? Result 1: Pilots are significantly more positive reciprocal and slightly less negative 
reciprocal towards pilots than students towards students.  
Evidence for this result can be found in Figure 3, which shows the average back transfers to 
different actions of players A. A clear difference between back transfers of pilots to back 
transfers of students can be found. Particularly, kind actions of players A are more rewarded 
                                                 
31 The version of the moonlighting game in Abbink, Irlenbusch and Renner (2000) give the A players a 
continuous choice to either transfer or extract points from B, hence only a comparison of the relative shares is 
possible. The continuous nature of the game also makes it possible to extract only a few points from player B, 
which usually are punished quite severely. This may explain why there is more evidence for negative reciprocity 
in Abbink, Irlenbusch and Renner (2002). Furthermore for player A positive transfers are tripled, while negative 
transfers are not altered by the experimenter. In the case of player B, only negative transfers are tripled. The 
moonlighting game of Cox, Sadiraj and Sadiraj (2002) shows further differences: Players B can not only reward 
or punish but even take money from player A. Cox, Sadiraj and Sadiraj (2002) find that 38% of their players B, 
who have lost money, take revenge on player A. Players B, who have made money, reinvested 39% of the 
money they have gained in to rewards. 
32 In Cox, Sadiraj and Sadiraj (2002) 43% choose a negative amount, 10% send 0 points and 47% a positive 
amount. 
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by pilots than students, which points to stronger positive reciprocity. Additionally, unkind 
actions of players A are less revenged by pilots than by students, which points to weaker 
negative reciprocity.  
 
Figure 3: B’s Actions: S-S vs. P-P treatment. 
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Table 2 presents a more stringent statistical test.33 An OLS regression is performed with 
heteroscedastic standard errors. The regression controls for age, squared age, gender and 
possible differences in education. According to the results in columns 1 through 3 of Table 2, 
variation in gender, age or education between students and pilots do not explain the whole 
difference in back transfers. Furthermore, it cannot be rejected (p < 0.01) that pilots show a 
more positive reciprocal nature than students. For negative reciprocity on the other hand I do 
not find a statistically significant difference between pilots and students. I therefore infer that 
the fact that negative reciprocity of pilots is not stronger compared to those of students cannot 
be rejected. To further substantiate my findings I added a conservative significance test, 
                                                 
33 As a paper and pencil method was applied, I am not able to prevent missing actions and beliefs. In addition to 
that, some individuals stated beliefs that added up to more than 100% and where therefore disregarded. Finally, 
few individuals probably misinterpreted the decision sheets. They stated decisions that are exactly the opposite 
of reciprocal, as they rewarded unfriendly and punished friendly actions. I believe that I should not consider 
these data for my analysis. However, additional regression results show that none of my findings are sensitive to 
the inclusion of these data. Exact tables of missing and used observations and beliefs can be found in  
through Tab  in the appendix. 
Table 16
le 19
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which adjusts for the fact that I test multiple hypotheses (Holm, 1979, as cited in Romano and 
Wolf, 2005). The data are robust to this test, as the significance level for positive reciprocity 
is not affected.34 
 
Table 2:  B’s actions conditional different actions of A 
(Comparison of S-S and P-P treatments) 
  
B’s action 
conditional a 
negative 
action of A 
 
 
B’s action 
conditional a 
neutral 
action of A 
 
B’s action 
conditional a 
positive action 
of A 
pilot 1.996   
(2.212) 
2.516   
(1.719) 
3.974### 
(1.081)*** 
male -1.023   
(1.643) 
0.804   
(1.414) 
3.132   
(1.428)** 
age -0.476   
(0.508) 
-0.117 
(0.348) 
-0.555   
(0.265)** 
age2 -0.007   
(0.007) 
0.001 
(0.005) 
0.006   
(0.003)* 
educ -0.243 
(0.393) 
0.246 
(0.379) 
0.162   
(0.151) 
const. -6.928   
(9.798) 
-1.147   
(7.277) 
11.364   
(4.488)** 
R2 0.056 0.092 0.333 
Prob > F 0.464 0.132 0.000 
n 88 88 88 
Notes: Dependent variable: B’s transfer after different actions 
of A. Coefficients of OLS-regression 
(Robust standard errors in parentheses). 
Level of significance: *0.1<p, **0.01<p<0.05, ***p<0.01,  
corrected levels for multiple hypothesis (Holm, 1979): 
 #0.1<p, ##0.01<p<0.05, ###p<0.01 
Source: own calculations based on experimental evidence from 
December 2005. 
 
The data also show some demographic differences. Age appears to have an effect on positive 
reciprocity, which follows a u-shape with a minimum at 46 years. These findings are very 
                                                 
34 To further assess the difference in social preferences between pilots and students, I examine the costs the 
subjects are willing to incur to respond to players A. The OLS regression results with the dependent variable 
being the absolute amount of money spent are represented in columns 1 through 3 of Table 15 in the appendix. 
The only significant difference I find between pilots and students is in the response to a positive transfer of 10 
points. Comparing column 1 of Table 15 to Table 2, I might infer from the fact that the point estimate drops 
from 2 to 0 points that pilots are not generally less engaged in interactive behaviour, but do it in a less negative 
way when treated unfriendly. This result gives some support to the assumption that pilots may be less negatively 
reciprocal.  
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close to those of Bellmare and Kroeger (2005). This is important because they use a 
representative panel of the population. In their trust game, they find a similar relation between 
age and the propensity to reward investments with a minimum between 35 and 40 years of 
age. A further similarity in results exists for the dummy variable “male”, which has a positive 
effect on back transfer when treated kindly (column 3).35 Lastly, education has no statistically 
significant effect on back transfers in my results, which might be caused by the low variation 
in my data. Bellmare and Kroeger (2005), however, find a negative educational effect for 
responders in an investment game. Due to the otherwise high comparability of my results to 
Bellmare and Kroeger (2005), who do not rely on student data only, I argue that the behaviour 
of my subjects might be in fact special compared to social preferences among the general 
population in an anonymous setting. 
 
Figure 4: B’s Actions: S-P vs. H-L vs. P-P Treatment. 
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To examine the exact nature of the cooperation differential I introduce social distance, first in 
the form of hierarchy by pairing high-ranking pilots with low-ranking pilots and finally in the 
form of total strangeness by pairing students with pilots.  
 
                                                 
35 Equal results can be found in Gueth, Schmidt and Sutter (2002). 
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? Result 2: Cooperative behaviour of pilots, mainly based on strong positive 
reciprocity, is not confined to fellow pilots. There is no difference in the back transfers 
of pilots to higher-ranking pilots or even students.  
Figure 4 shows virtually no difference between the back transfers of treatments P-P, H-L and 
S-P.36 More stringent results are displayed in Table 3 where OLS-regressions with cluster 
analysis have been run. Dummy-variables have been added for the S-P and the H-L treatment, 
the P-P treatment being the base group in this case.  
 
Table 3:  B’s actions conditional different actions of A 
 (Comparison of P-P, S-P and H-L treatments) 
 
B’s action 
conditional a 
negative 
action of A 
B’s action 
conditional a 
neutral 
action of A 
B’s action 
conditional a 
positive 
action of A 
S-P 0.725 
(0.719) 
-0.482 
(0.525) 
-0.227   
(0.327) 
H-L 0.284 
(0.386) 
-0.336   
(0.253) 
-0.073   
(0.148) 
≥major 0.593 
(2.075) 
-0.394 
(1.578) 
-0.552 
(0.874) 
male -2.505 
(3.255) 
0.447   
(2.160) 
0.709       
    (0.336)** 
age 0.229   
(0.457) 
0.510 
(0.321) 
-0.007 
(0.167) 
age2 -0.005   
(0.006) 
-0.007 
(0.004)* 
-0.000 
(0.002) 
educ -0.069   
(0.289) 
0.328   
(0.288) 
0.231 
    (0.088)*** 
const. -0.544 
(9.766) 
-10.476   
(7.330) 
6.033 
    (2.974)** 
R2 0.052 0.045 0.033 
Prob > F 0.225 0.286 0.073 
n 233 233 233 
clusters 113 113 113 
Prob >F for 
 S-P and H-L 
0.587 0.408 0.784 
Notes: Dependent variable: B’s transfer after different actions of A. 
Coefficients of OLS-regression (Robust standard errors adjusted for 
clustering on individuals in parentheses). 
Level of significance: *0.1<p, **0.01<p<0.05, ***p<0.01,  
corrected levels for multiple hypothesis (Holm, 1979):  
#0.1<p, ##0.01<p<0.05, ###p<0.01 
Source: own calculations based on experimental evidence from 
December 2005. 
                                                 
36 There is no concern for effects of subjects playing both roles in the experiment (see for example Burks, 
Carpenter and Verhoogen, 2003), as this is not the case in the same treatment. The procedure, however, does not 
exclude a possible order effect, which is minimized by not informing the subjects about their earnings before the 
end of the last treatment. 
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According to columns 1-3, I must conclude that the two treatment effects are not statistically 
significant. No differences between the three treatments where detected. The precision of this 
result is fairly high, as differences above 0.6 points would have been picked up. The 
respective F-tests confirm the result.37  
It is interesting to ask whether pilots perceive any difference at all between pilots and students 
playing part A.38 According to Figure 5 pilots have identical beliefs about pilots of the same 
or higher rank. By contrast, their beliefs about students' behaviour are more negative. They 
expect a lower percentage of the students to transfer 10 points, and a higher percentage to take 
5 points. 
 
Figure 5:  B’s Beliefs about A’s Actions in different Treatments. 
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37 To detect if superiors behave differently from normal pilots, probably due to higher salaries, I introduced an 
additional variable for ranks starting with major. As no statistical significant difference can be detected I 
furthermore conclude that there is also no wealth effect (as majors earn more than captains) involved in the 
equation, which confirm findings of Slonim and Roth (1998) and Bellmare and Kroeger (2005). 
38 This has been suggested by Manski (2002) and applied by Bellmare, Kroeger and van Soest (2005). However, 
as in my case the strategy method has been applied I do not consider using beliefs as an independent variable in 
the regression. Every pilot had the chance to make conditional decisions, which cannot depend on his beliefs of 
the distribution of the actions of first movers. Hence the actual decision of player A cannot in any logical sense 
influence the decision of player B.  
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Again, Table 4 presents statistical tests. OLS-regressions with cluster analysis confirm the 
results. This shows that pilots are well aware of their partners and all the same do not change 
their behaviour. 
Table 4:  B’s beliefs about percentages of players A making different 
actions. (Comparison of P-P, S-P and H-L treatments) 
  
B’s Beliefs 
about % of A 
making a 
negative 
transfer 
 
B’s Beliefs 
about % of A 
not 
transferring 
anything 
 
 
B’s Beliefs 
about % of A 
making a  
positive  
transfer 
 
S-P 8.584### 
(1.922)*** 
4.729 
(3.162) 
-13.314### 
(3.827)*** 
H-L 0.606 
(0.904) 
-0.038 
(1.881) 
-0.569 
(2.267) 
≥major 
 
-8.259 
(4.226)* 
1.670 
(8.935) 
6.589 
(10.239) 
male -5.247 
(2.591)** 
10.530 
(3.045)*** 
-5.283 
(4.048) 
age -0.151 
(1.261)* 
3.577 
(1.609)** 
-3.426 
(2.098) 
age2 0.009 
(0.017)* 
-0.039 
(0.021)* 
0.030 
(0.028) 
educ 0.771 
(1.225) 
0.112 
(1.431) 
-0.883 
(1.908) 
const. 1.660 
(21.575) 
-57.558 
(32.947)* 
155.898 
(44.080)*** 
R2 0.089 0.110 0.149 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 
n 204 204 204 
clusters 101 101 101 
Notes: Dependent variable: B’s belief about how many percents of A 
making different actions. Coefficients of OLS-regression (Robust 
standard errors adjusted for clustering on individuals in parentheses). 
Level of significance: *0.1<p, **0.01<p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
corrected levels for multiple hypothesis (Holm, 1979): 
 #0.1<p, ##0.01<p<0.05, ###p<0.01 
Source: own calculations based on experimental evidence from 
December 2005. 
It is tentative to conclude that the Swiss Air Force is able to screen, train or socialize its pilots 
in a way that cooperation is primarily sustained through higher levels of positive reciprocity, 
and the effect is robust to social hierarchy. It is astonishing, however, that pilots do not 
change their behaviour when paired with outsiders. This result is surprising, as other studies 
have found strong effects of social distance (La Porta et al., 1997; Fershtman and Gneezy, 
2001; Ruffle and Sosis, 2006; Hoff and Pandey, 2006; Bernhard, Fehr and Fischbacher, 2006; 
Goette, Huffmann and Meier, 2006). Therefore I conclude that differences in the behaviour of 
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pilots compared to other subjects are not mainly caused by social ties but rather by more 
cooperative preferences of pilots.  
Even though the situation is less clear for Player A, the next subsection analyses his 
behaviour. 
2.4.3  Behaviour of Player A 
? Result 3: Pilots do not seem to transfer more than students.  
The formal statistical test can be found in the second column of Table 5,39 where the amount 
transferred to Player B is regressed on the treatment condition. I do not find a statistically 
significant difference between the transfer of pilots compared to students when controlling for 
gender, age, age2 and education. The maximum-likelihood ordered probit estimation in the 
next column of Table 5, which accounts for the restricted choice characteristic for Player A, 
confirms the results.  
 
Figure 6: A’s Actions: S-S vs. P-P Treatment. 
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If I compare these results to Figure 6, which shows the different distributions in percents of 
choices of students and pilots in the position of Player A, I am astonished: As I had originally 
                                                 
39 The 4 observations that had no respective beliefs (see  and  in the appendix) had to be 
dropped to keep estimations comparable. This caused no significance difference in the results. 
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Table 5:  A’s actions / A’s beliefs about B’s back-transfer conditional different transfers of player A / A’s actions according beliefs 
(Comparison of P-P and S-S treatments) 
 A’s action A’s action according Belief A’s Belief about B’s back transfer 
  
OLS 
ordered 
Probit 
 
OLS 
ordered 
Probit 
after a negative  
transfer 
after a neutral 
transfer 
after a positive 
transfer 
P-P 3.467 
(1.655)** 
1.298 
(1.896) 
0.293 
(0.445) 
-0.706 
(1.875) 
-0.218 
(0.476) 
2.550 
(1.539) 
1.722 
(1.743) 
1.975 
(1.032)* 
2.008 
(1.277) 
3.891## 
(1.356)*** 
3.165 
(1.847)* 
male 0.796 
(2.223) 
0.977 
(2.110) 
0.228 
(0.402) 
1.501 
(2.027) 
0.473 
(0.419) 
0.784 
(1.334) 
0.853 
(1.336) 
-0.139 
(0.714) 
-0.142 
(0.733) 
-0.702 
(1.456) 
-0.641 
(1.487) 
age -0.053 
(0.065) 
0.809 
(0.494) 
0.183 
(0.124) 
0.777 
(0.499) 
0.222 
(0.128)* 
-0.048 
(0.058) 
0.281 
(0.410) 
-0.033 
(0.042) 
-0.047 
(0.273) 
-0.082 
(0.038)** 
0.206 
(0.344) 
age2  -0.011 
(0.065)* 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
-0.010 
(0.007) 
-0.003 
(0.002)* 
 -0.004 
(0.005) 
 0.000 
(0.003) 
 -0.004 
(0.004) 
educ -0.006 
(0.500) 
0.021 
(0.383) 
0.027 
(0.089) 
-0.119 
(0.520) 
-0.039 
(0.117) 
-0.510 
(0.338) 
-0.499 
(0.299)* 
-0.187 
(0.153) 
-0.187 
(0.151) 
0.239 
(0.234) 
0.248 
(0.267) 
A's belief after 
pos action 
   0.490 
(0.264)* 
0.093 
(0.055)* 
      
A's belief after 
neut action 
   0.382 
(0.263) 
0.131 
(0.077)* 
      
A's belief after 
neg action 
   -0.182 
(0.124) 
-0.062 
(0.034)* 
      
cut1   3.131 
(2.239) 
 3.962 
(2.435) 
      
cut2   2.230 
(2.206) 
 2.916 
(2.432) 
      
const. 5.244 
(7.091) 
-8.475 
(9.119) 
 -10.514 
(9.833) 
 2.261 
(4.427) 
-2.972 
(7.060) 
3.039 
(1.797)* 
3.252 
(4.073) 
5.109 
(3.042)* 
0.521 
(6.700)* 
(pseudo) R2 0.076 0.106 0.063 0.266 0.171 0.068 0.073 0.055 0.055 0.143 0.150 
Prob > F 
Prob > Chi2 
0.180 0.158  
0.219 
0.010  
0.045 
0.115 0.163 0.173 0.232 0.010 0.004 
n 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 
Prob >F 
Prob > Chi2  
for all Beliefs 
   0.082  
0.048 
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Notes: Dependent variable: First Column: A’s action (-5, 0, 10), coefficients of OLS-regression. Second column: A’s action, coefficient 
of ordered Probit-regression, third through fifth column: A’s belief about B’s back-transfer conditional different actions of A. 
Coefficients of OLS-regressions. Sixth column: A’s transfer to B, coefficients of OLS-regression, seventh column: coefficient of 
ordered Probit-regression (Robust standard errors in parentheses). 
Level of significance: *0.1<p, **0.01<p<0.05, ***p<0.01 corr. levels for mult. hypo. (Holm, 1979): #0.1<p, ##0.01<p<0.05, ###p<0.01 
Source: own calculations based on experimental evidence from December 2005. 
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expected, clearly more pilots than students send 10 points to Player B. But the control 
variables of the regression seem to explain the whole difference.40 Furthermore the estimators 
for age point towards an inverted u-shape of the age effect with a maximum at the age of 37. 
This result is very comparable to those of Bellmare and Kroeger (2005), who find in their 
representative panel an inverted u shaped age-effect with a maximum at 37 years as well.41 
Hence I conclude that pilots do not seem to transfer more than students as players A, as any 
difference is already explained by the control variables. 
As I expected that pilots transfer more because they believe in higher back-transfers of fellow 
pilots, it is interesting to study whether actions of players A correlate with different beliefs 
about the conditional back transfer of players B (Camerer and Fehr, 2006; Goette, Huffmann 
and Meier, 2006).42 
? Result 4: Actions seem to be mainly motivated by players’ beliefs in positive and 
negative reciprocity, i.e. by more optimistic beliefs about back-transfers. 
An OLS and ordered probit regression incorporating subjects’ beliefs as independent 
variables are displayed in the fourth and fifth column of Table 5. They show that indeed 
beliefs are statistically significant factors for subjects’ actions.43 All the more, the r-squared 
climbs from 11% (in the regression without beliefs) to 27%, which indicates the high 
relevance of the beliefs. Finally, the relevant combined F-tests confirm the results. It appears 
as if higher transfers are motivated by more optimistic beliefs about positive, neutral and 
negative actions.44  
                                                 
40 To find out, whether there is a good reason to include the control variables, I run different regressions and 
found that finally the squared age effect is responsible for the high p-value of the treatment factor. To show the 
effect, I included in the first column of  a regression without this factor, where the statistical effect of the 
P-P treatment is quantitatively large and significant as originally expected. However, as age2 has a p-value of 
0.088 and age one of 0.105, I may not exclude the factor. 
Table 5
41 Additionally Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) find similar effects. A possible explanation can be found in 
Glaeser, Laibson and Sacerdote (2002), who argue that investment in social capital follows the same pattern as 
investment in human capital.  
42 Fehr et al. (2006) accordingly find in a trust game that not all the differences in transfers between Americans 
and Germans can be explained by different beliefs. 
43 The respective p-values for the factors of the two regressions are not very different but climb over the 10% 
margin for the OLS-regression in the case of A’s beliefs after neutral and negative actions. 
44 However, one has to be cautious interpreting these results as beliefs might be affected by risk aversion. 
Furthermore as their beliefs have been asked after they had made their decision, it seems possible that the 
subjects acted according their intuition and when asked about their expectations, justified their decisions through 
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Finally I study the beliefs of players A. 
? Result 5: There is weak evidence that Pilots believe in higher back-transfers than 
students.  
The formal statistical test can be found in the last columns of Table 5, where the beliefs of 
players A about back-transfers of Player B after negative, neutral and positive transfer are 
regressed on the treatment condition. I find a statistically significant difference between the 
beliefs of pilots and students when controlling for gender, age, and education. The estimated 
difference in believed back-transfers after a positive action is 3.9 points and is statistically 
significant with a p-value of 0.005.45 However, as I include the squared effect of age, only 
beliefs about back-transfers after positive actions are positive and marginally statistically 
significant with a p-value of 0.090.46 This result is astonishing when compared to Figure 7 
where clearly pilots believe in higher back-transfers of Players B than do the students. 
 
Figure 7: A’s Beliefs: S-S vs. P-P Treatment. 
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It seems unclear whether pilots do not transfer more because they do not have more optimistic 
beliefs about back-transfers than students, or whether the ambiguous effects of risk 
preferences in the moonlighting game offset the slightly more optimistic beliefs of pilots. 
                                                                                                                                                        
appropriate beliefs (Kahnemann, 2003), although the experimenter promised the subjects money for accuracy in 
beliefs. 
45 When I apply the multiple hypotheses test (Holm, 1979) the p-value climbs to 0.015. 
46 They even become statistically insignificant if the multiple hypothesis-test is applied (Holm, 1979). 
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To finally test for social distance due to hierarchical effects, I compare the P-P to the H-L 
treatment. 
? Result 6: Higher-ranking pilots do not trust less in lower-ranking pilots and therefore 
do not transfer less to lower ranks, compared to pilots interacting with equal ranks.  
Only graphical evidence for this result can be given in Figure 8 as just four players A changed 
their action from H-L to P-P treatment. Surprisingly it was all to the worse of their partners. 
The results complement the previous findings from players B. They suggest that hierarchy in 
this setting has no disruptive effect on social preferences. This must be one feature of the very 
special work environment even though it is within the armed forces where hierarchy plays a 
more influential role than in the civilian world (Akerlof and Kranton, 2005). 
 
Figure 8: A’s Actions: H-L vs. P-P Treatment. 
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2.5. Conclusions 
Cooperation within its workforce is a highly important factor for almost every firm in the 
market (La Porta et al., 1997). However, it is difficult to enforce cooperation among workers: 
It is hard to observe and therefore unlikely to be enforced by incentives created by repeated 
interactions between workers and firms. Hence high levels of cooperation must be established 
on account of higher grades of positive or negative reciprocity. 
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Previous studies have shown that negative reciprocity is a strong behavioural force when 
subjects are mostly college students (Charness and Rabin, 2002). However, negative 
reciprocity among workers may bear inefficient outcomes for a firm. Furthermore, if workers 
of different levels have to cooperate, perceived hierarchy may hinder cooperation. Therefore I 
hypothesized that firms could assure cooperation by appropriate screening, training or 
socialization of its workers. 
To test this hypothesis, I use a subject pool of professional Swiss Air Force pilots, who must 
arguably cooperate very closely to achieve their mission goals. To detect both positive and 
negative reciprocity I apply the moonlighting game (Abbink, Irlenbusch and Renner, 2000). 
I find that pilots are indeed significantly more positive reciprocal and slightly less negative 
reciprocal towards pilots than students towards students.47 Furthermore the estimators of my 
control variables are very comparable to those of Bellmare and Kroeger (2005), who use data 
of a representative panel of the Dutch population. Therefore I infer that my results are of 
general relevance. I can furthermore show that trust may depend on the level of expected 
reciprocity. However, the higher levels of trust expressed by pilots seem to be mostly 
explained by control variables. But this unexpected result may be biased due to the 
ambiguous effects of risk preferences in the moonlighting game. 
To test for the effects of perceived hierarchy, I conduct further experiments and find that 
pilots' stronger positive and weaker negative reciprocity is not confined to the interaction with 
fellow pilots. Pilots do not treat higher-ranking pilots different than fellow pilots.  
I finally study how pilots behave towards strangers. I find that pilots do not change their 
behaviour, as there is no difference between their back transfers to students and their back 
transfers to their fellow pilots. Thus my results suggest that these pilots have different 
preferences and are even outside their environment more cooperative. This is astonishing in 
light of previous studies that indicate strong effects of group identity (Gachter and Fehr, 1999; 
La Porta et al., 1997; Fershtman and Gneezy, 2001; Ruffle and Sosis, 2006; Hoff and Pandey, 
2006; Bernhard, Fehr and Fischbacher, 2006; Goette, Huffmann and Meier, 2006).  
These findings indicate that the Swiss Air Force is in fact able to screen, train or socialize its 
pilots in a way that cooperation among its workers is primarily maintained through positive 
                                                 
47 This Result does not contradict Mas (2006) who finds strong negative reciprocity among police agents. It 
seems impossible in his set-up to detect positive reciprocity at all, as either the expectations of the policemen are 
met or not met but never exceeded. Furthermore he researches the interaction of firms and workers, while in my 
case I examine the interaction between workers and workers. 
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reciprocity, and hierarchy does not compromise teamwork. Future research should address 
this issue and try to separate these different possible channels. 
Not surprisingly there is evidence which points towards the screening thesis: In Hedinger 
(2004) I showed that reserve pilots of the Swiss Air Force that work in non-flying jobs (e.g. as 
engineers or medical doctors) and pass the same screening as the professional pilots earn 
significantly more than comparable individuals with an equal job.48 This could be interpreted 
as an exceptionally high level of productivity, which may be based on high teamwork 
abilities. Hence, if reserve pilots show the same levels of reciprocity, cooperation could be 
claimed to screening effects.  
The findings of this chapter imply that an employer who claims having such a workforce does 
not need to enforce cooperation among its workers. Furthermore, he might even profit from 
the exceptionally high levels of positive reciprocity, as his employees do not distinguish 
between superiors or fellow workers. To find out whether this is true I focus in the next 
chapter on the applicability of reciprocity to the relations of employees and employers. I use 
the example of subjective performance evaluations. 
 
 
48 After including various control variables, propensity-matching estimates a salary difference of 25%. 
CHAPTER 3:  
 
 
Reciprocity Effects of Subjective 
Performance Evaluations 
A Case Study with personnel records 
3.1. Introduction 
For managers, the ability to predict the possible consequences of the implementation of 
different incentive systems is very important. In the case of the direct incentive system, it has 
long been known that this system only enhances the performance that is measured (Gibbons, 
1998: 115f; Prendergast, 1999:8). Consequently, the more comprehensive subjective 
performance evaluation system has been suggested. This should induce the optimal allocation 
of time and effort to the multiplicity of tasks in most of today’s jobs. But this system has 
rarely been researched by economists (Prendergast, 1999:9;11;22;56-57). Data and 
measurable factors seem to be very difficult to obtain, perhaps also because evaluations are of 
a subjective nature. With this chapter I will try to close part of this gap by making use of an 
unusual situation: I use a dataset of subjective performance evaluations in a “multi-task”49 
environment, combining it with operational data that has not been available to the evaluating 
persons. They were therefore unable to directly observe specific tasks. Hence, this unobserved 
effort might not affect performance evaluations. This situation renders me the perfect 
opportunity to find out whether subjective performance evaluations have spillover effects on 
                                                 
49 I use the term “Multi-Task” according to Prendergast (1999:22), who does not mean that a worker has to 
perform many tasks at the same time, but that he has to choose to which of many tasks he primarily allocates his 
time and effort. 
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the provision of unobserved effort in the next period. To predict these effects, I use the 
insights of a growing literature in reciprocity that is mainly based on experiments. It may help 
to shed some new light on how a subjective incentive system influences the provision of 
unobserved effort. 
I believe the subject is relevant for more than just this specific situation because most systems 
using subjective performance evaluations may not be able to consider all aspects of 
performance or effort. Today’s multi-tasking environments are just too complex. Standard 
incentive system theory would predict that unaccounted effort would vanish because it does 
not enhance a worker’s salary (Prendergast, 1999:22-29). But in a system with subjective 
performance evaluations, a worker does not solely depend on his shown performance alone, 
but is also, to some extent, at the mercy of his superiors if not all tasks are fully verifiable. 
This fact may give rise to considerations of fairness and reciprocity. A worker might react 
positively to a good evaluation or negatively to a bad one. As the worker in a long-term 
contract does not want to punish himself by endangering his subjective performance 
evaluation, he would most probably reward or retaliate in the field of unobserved effort. I 
consequently researched whether employees tend to react reciprocally by means of 
unobserved effort to changes in their subjective performance evaluations and if so unobserved 
effort may be sustainable. 
To research this question I use a combined longitudinal dataset of subjective performance 
evaluations with the recorded working hours of all Swiss Air Force pilots. I received the data 
from my former direct superior, the commander of these aviators.50 The specific situation of 
the Swiss Air Force pilots is the following: They not only have to fly a lot, but also perform 
many other tasks, for which a pilot’s experience is essential. These extra duties (often 
deskwork) are, from the perspective of the Air Force, complements to normal duties and 
therefore vital. But I can demonstrate that direct superiors cannot always supervise the 
amount of hours a pilot spends on extra duties.51 These figures are only available to the 
headquarters, for other statistical evaluations. Therefore the amount of extra duties a pilot 
performs may be considered as unverifiable and hence to a great extent at his own 
discretion.52 The wage effective performance evaluations applied by the Swiss Air Force is 
                                                 
50 Being myself a pilot of the Swiss Air Force helped me to understand the complex dataset. 
51 According to my analysis, performing more extra duties does not result in a better subjective performance 
evaluation. 
52 Furthermore pilots may be less intrinsically motivated to fulfil these tasks rather than to perform normal flight 
duties. 
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thus primarily based on subjectivity. But this subjectivity may give rise to reciprocal reactions 
in the field of unobserved efforts: If pilots were to react to changes in their subjective 
performance evaluations by changes in the accomplishment of extra duties, reciprocity would 
then prevail. 
My results show reciprocal behaviour in the accomplishment of extra duties after a change in 
the individual subjective performance evaluation. This behaviour however vanishes after one 
period if the same subjective performance evaluation is issued again. A possible explanation 
is a strong dependence of effort on expectations. Hence, as long as expectations are met, the 
provision of unobserved effort seems to be sustained but not enhanced due to reciprocity. 
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows: In section two I provide the fundamentals by 
giving a quick review of the literature. I furthermore provide more details about Swiss Air 
Force pilots and introduce the applicable theory of Benjamin (2006). Section three renders the 
propositions. The empirical analysis and the results are discussed in section four. Finally 
section five is the summary and conclusion of this chapter. 
3.2. Fundamentals 
3.2.1 Prior Literature 
In recent years many theoretical papers on the subject of reciprocal behaviour and fairness try 
to answer several basic questions (e.g. Akerlof, 1982; Akerlof and Yellen, 1988 and 1990; 
Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Falk and Fischbacher, 2000; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Charness 
and Rabin, 2002; Camerer and Fehr, 2006). In addition, a growing literature researches the 
matter by using experiments to predict human reactions.53 Field data about human behaviour 
also confirm reciprocity on a general level. E.g. Krueger and Mas (2004) found in the tire 
industry that bad working conditions had been retaliated with bad quality production.54 Field 
                                                 
53 Some studies in order of their appearance are Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl (1993), Berg, Dickhaut and 
McCabe (1995), Fehr, Gachter and Kirchsteiger (1997), Fehr and Falk (1999), Fehr and Gachter (2000b), Falk 
and Gachter (2002), Andreoni, Harbaugh and Vesterlund (2003), Fehr and Schmidt (2004), Fehr and List (2004), 
Charness (2004) and Gachter, Kessler and Koenigstein (2006). 
54 Other Studies are Katz, Kochan and Gobeille (1983), who found effects off grievance, discipline rates and 
union-management climate on economic performance, Cappelli and Chauvin (1991) found that a wage premium 
reduces shirking, Kleiner, Leonard and Pilarski (2002) found effects of strikes and slowdowns on performance in 
the aircraft manufacturing industry, Bartel et al (2004) correlate a opinion survey to performance in a major 
bank, Mas and Berkeley (2004) found that labour unrest causes bad quality in construction equipment and Mas 
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data about individual wages, in contrast, have mostly been evaluated in the aspect of the 
direct interdependence of incentives and relevant measured performance (e.g. Lazear, 
2000).55 Another avenue of research has been with tournaments, which reflect the purely 
economic considerations of employees, who evaluate marginal costs versus marginal 
returns.56 Even the idea of efficiency wages is a mere evaluation of the returns (such as 
shirking) versus the costs (such as loosing a job) (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984).57 Only the 
study of Gneezy and List (2006) is closely related to this chapter, as they research reciprocal 
reactions of workers using experimental field data.58 So there is to my knowledge no study so 
far which explicitly tries to answer whether subjective performance evaluations affect 
unobserved effort in long-term employments by means of reciprocity. 
                                                                                                                                                        
3.2.2 Institutional Background 
To be able to understand the effects of reciprocity, I will have to step back and focus on the 
specific work environment of Swiss Air Force pilots. Let me thus discuss their freedom of 
action, their different duties and their incentive system. 
The contracts of Swiss Air Force pilots are kept largely vague when it comes to working 
hours. It states, "Work according to needs.” (own translation of Federal Department of 
Defence, 2003a:8, Art.19). The government, who wants pilots to protect the airspace above 
Switzerland, transport passengers and cargo in times of war and peace, defines this ‘need’. 
Transport and protection requests are, for example, in the case of the annual World Economic 
Forum in Davos, very precise. Pilots are then tasked by their Centre of Operations. A pilot, 
(2006) researched the effects of final offer arbitrations and found very significant results, which indicate that 
workers shirk more, and work less passionate if they loos arbitration. 
55 Other studies are e.g. Fox, Scott and Donohue (1993), Rajagopalan (1997) and Fehr and Goette (2005). Even 
Kahn and Sherer (1990), who researched the effects of a subjective performance assessment on later 
performance, used the same performance evaluation to measure later effort levels as was used to determine 
bonuses and merit pay rises. 
56 Some studies are e.g. Coupé, Smeets and Warzynski (2003) and Lavy (2004). Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul 
(2005) even compare piece-rates to tournaments. There are also studies on the side effects of incentive schemes 
as e.g. Camerer and Hogarth (1999), Dohmen and Falk (2006), Eriksson and Villeval (2004) or Eriksson, 
Teyssier and Villeval (2006). Furthermore Krakel (2004) studied the effects of emotions on the performance of 
incentive systems. 
57 For an early overview of related theories see e.g. Katz (1986). 
58 Also related is the study of Fairis and Alston (1994) who use individual data but as a proxy for the effort level 
the worker’s self-assessment whether his job requires him to work hard. For further overviews see e.g. 
Prendergast (1999). 
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however, may tell the dispatcher in advance that he has other duties to perform. He would 
then be relieved from flying missions if at all possible. At other times, when only few tasks 
have to be performed, pilots should train themselves to maintain a certain level of proficiency. 
Again, a pilot might only perform the compulsory minimum training if he has other things to 
do. This provides pilots a lot of flexibility on how to spend their time. They may either fly a 
lot or perform other duties mostly at their own discretion. But why does the system allow 
professional pilots to sit on the ground and what other duties are there to be performed? 
Besides various normal duties like flying missions, learning or teaching to fly and everyday 
administrative work, there are many extra duties, which nevertheless have to be performed by 
pilots. A non-complete list of these extra duties would include representative work, the 
organisation of operations, work for superiors or other organisations as representatives of the 
Air Force, the publication of new manuals, the evaluation and re-evaluation of equipment, 
work in the field of human resources and IT, pre-screening or flight safety activities, missions 
abroad and other special projects.59 All these duties have common factors that only a pilot’s 
special know-how makes his participation crucial and thus complement normal duties. If for 
example nobody manages the tiny airspace above Switzerland, efficient training is 
jeopardised. Some of these extra duties are performed by pilots in management positions. To 
maintain their pilot skills they also fly part-time. Many other extra duties are achieved on the 
basis of voluntary commitment. But effort-costs are presumably higher for extra duties than 
for normal duties as many pilots would rather sit in an aircraft than perform deskwork 
duties.60 This intrinsic motivation causes an immanent lack of pilots who voluntarily perform 
extra duties.61 In such situations of shortages, the performance of extra duties bears a higher 
relative payoff for the Swiss Air Force than that of normal duties. As a result almost every 
superior is willing to allow for less normal duty time as, for example, flying missions, in order 
to let a pilot perform more extra duties. They even permit certain pilots to become less 
operational and, for example, only fly small aircraft to allow them to do all their extra duties. 
This trade-off between the performance of normal and extra duties may thus be seen as a 
typical motivational problem in a multiple-task environment (Prendergast, 1999:22-29), 
which may be solved by an adequate incentive system. Let me thus turn to this issue. 
                                                 
59 For a detailed list see  in the appendix. Table 21
60 This view is further supported by the fact that pilots have been especially pre-screened for their motivation to 
fly (Noser, 2003).  
61 A related study by Cavalluzzo (1991) researches the value of a command over deskwork for US Air Force 
pilots. 
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The salary of a Swiss Air Force pilot consists of two parts: The less interesting part is a fixed 
wage component that a pilot receives in the light of compensating wage differentials (Borjas, 
2002:201-225) as long as he bears the higher risk of death caused by military aviation 
(Federal Department of Defence, 2003b:1272, Art.2).62 The more interesting part of his salary 
depends on his actual hierarchical position and more importantly on a subjective performance 
evaluation. This performance evaluation, which is of central interest to us, was introduced in 
November 2000 and became wage-effective two years later. It replaced the previous 3% 
annual wage increase which pilots received until their wage reached the maximum for their 
wage bracket, which is defined by their hierarchical position.63 Now the yearly wage-
increment is only affected by the subjective performance evaluation called LOBE and may 
vary between 0% and 6% of the maximum of one’s wage bracket. LOBE, which stands for 
"Lohnrelevante Beurteilung" and translates as "wage-relevant evaluation" (or literally “to 
praise”), is a purely subjective performance assessment as suggested by Baker (2000:420).64 
Every year in November the pilot has to agree to individual evaluation criteria his superior 
has prepared. These criteria may consist of a pilot “showing a strong willingness to fulfil his 
tasks” or of a pilot “using wisely his freedom of action”. The superior then evaluates to what 
extent the pilot fulfils these criteria. The following October, the pilot then receives the result 
of his subjective performance evaluation. The result is rated and ranges from 1-5. With an 
evaluation of 1 the employee would not get any wage increase and may fear lay-off. With an 
evaluation of 5, the employee would get a wage increase of 6% of the maximum salary of his 
wage bracket or up to a 12% bonus-payment if he already reached this maximum. It is 
normally reached after about 20 years of tenure for a normal pilot.65 If a pilot gets promoted 
to squadron commander or into another management position, he will each time change into 
another wage bracket with an approximately 5% higher maximum. He once gets a 5% salary 
increase and then falls back into the LOBE-cycle but gets his salary rises in reference to the 
maximum of his new wage bracket. Even though it would seem attractive to, at first, change 
wage brackets, the fact that few takers for managerial positions have been available in recent 
                                                 
62 This risk is not to be confused with the economic risk-sharing problem between employers and employees (see 
e.g. Bloom and Milkovich, 1998). 
63 These wage increments had been a pure reflection of tenure as described in e.g. Prendergast (1999:45-51) as 
deferred compensation. 
64 For a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of such systems in different governments see e.g. 
Eisenberg and Ingraham (1993).  
65 If good evaluations and therefore high wage increases appear at an early stage, the system can be thought of as 
one with long-term earning effects as the merit system in Kahn and Sherer (1990:112S). 
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years (Air Transport, 2007:3), a respective tournament may be excluded. A plausible reason 
may be the increased amount of extra duty that may bear higher effort-costs than the 5% 
difference in salary may be able to compensate. 
To prevent the sum of all salaries from rising due to a “leniency bias” (Prendergast, 1999:30), 
a forced distribution is established (Swiss Government, 2001:21, Art.49; Head of the Armed 
Forces, 2004). All the same, the LOBE-system can not be considered as a tournament, 
because everybody is working on his individual criteria and has no idea of the results of his 
subjective performance evaluation relative to others. But this result may serve as a perfect 
proxy for real salary changes as it is a standard evaluation independent of inflation and wage 
brackets that may bear income effects (Prendergast, 1999:50). 
With all of this in mind, LOBE might seem to easily resolve the motivational problems within 
the multi-tasking environment described earlier: Even though pilots may have lower effort-
costs for normal duties, they should be motivated to fulfil both duties to receive an adequate 
subjective performance evaluation. And pilots are indeed required to declare the allocation of 
their working hours to different tasks on a daily basis. Nevertheless, this data is only available 
to the headquarters that uses them exclusively to statistically evaluate the different tasks. This 
means that the amount of duties performed is not only unverifiable but also unobserved by the 
direct superior. Furthermore some superiors sometimes hardly ever see their subordinates as 
the pilots are deployed to different airbases on an irregular basis.66 Consequently subjectivity 
may play a major role in this evaluation system.67 How then are pilots motivated to perform 
extra duties since the costs for their accomplishment seems to be higher than for those of 
normal duties? One possible means may be the effects of reciprocity: An employee might 
reward the result of a subjective performance evaluation if the superior appreciates the 
employee’s work.  
Since, unlike direct superiors, I was given access to the operational data from the former 
headquarters, allowing me to pursue the research of this idea. But allow me to start by 
reviewing a theory that may be able to predict pilot behaviour. 
                                                 
66 I hence deviate from the commonly assumption that some effort is observable but not verifiable (Gibbons, 
1998:121). This fact would rule out the point of Brown, Falk and Fehr (2002) who showed that repeated 
interactions might overcome the leaks of incomplete contracts. If however the leak is not observed by the 
superior, their findings may not be applied to the described situation. 
67 This might be especially true because superiors are never fully objective when issuing a subjective 
performance evaluation (Schettgen, 1996:261, Fallgatter, 1999:84-87).  
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3.2.3 Theory 
Out of the many theoretical papers on the subject of reciprocal behaviour and fairness, I 
decided to use a theoretical work by Benjamin (2006), who applied the well-known theory of 
inequity aversion by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) to the labour market situation. Here is a quick 
review of the theory and their later development: 
Fehr and Schmidt (1999:822) define the utility of person i in a two-player game of i and j as 
follows: 
 Ui(x)=xi - αimax{xj-xi,0} - βimax{xi-xj,0}, i≠j (1) 
In equation (1), xi and xj are the shares the two players get. The second term reflects person i's 
utility loss from disadvantageous inequality, while the third term measures the loss from 
advantageous inequality (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999:822). Therefore αi might reflect person i's 
motivation to show negative reciprocity and βi to show positive reciprocity.68 
To use this theory in my environment I benefit from its later development by Benjamin 
(2006), who applied it to the general situation of firms and workers. He transformed α and β 
in the following way (Benjamin, 2006:32): 
 βαφ += , βα
βγ +=  (2), (3) 
Now φ reflects the weight an employee puts on fairness, while γ reflects the importance of 
fairness for the worker when he is better off and (1-γ) when he is worse off.  
In his theory, the firm's payoff πF and the worker's payoff πW depend on the offered wage w 
and the later chosen effort level e (Benjamin, 2006:6): 
 πF(w,e)=y(e)-w, while y’>0, y’’<0 (4) 
 πW(w,e)=v(w)-c(e), while v’>0, v’’<0 and c’>0, c’’>0 (5) 
In (4) and (5) y(e) is the firm’s production function, c(e) the worker’s cost function and v(w) 
the worker’s function for the benefit of higher compensation. 
Furthermore Benjamin (2006:7-8) defines surplus payoffs of a firm and a worker as: 
 
FFF ew πππ ˆ),(~ −≡  (6) 
 
WWW ew πππ ˆ),(~ −≡   (7) 
                                                 
68 Fehr and Schmidt (1999:853) claimed in their original paper that their model is also able to predict reciprocal 
behaviour. Hence instead of measures of inequality aversion, the parameters may also be regarded as measures 
of reciprocity. 
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In (6) and (7), πˆ  are the reference payoffs of the firm and worker. These will play a major 
role in the further analysis. 
Benjamin (2006:8-9) now assumes that the worker maximises his utility: 
 UW=πW  +  φ[-γmax{ Wπ~ - Fπ~ , 0} - (1-γ)max{ Fπ~ - Wπ~ , 0}] (8) 
Analogical to (1) the long second term in equation (8) reflects the workers care for fairness. 
To assess which effort level the worker chooses, Benjamin (2006:15) first postulates a 
reference effort level for the case that the firm’s and the worker’s surplus payoffs are equal: 
 efair(w):≡ [πW(w,e)- f
e
maxarg πˆ W, πF(w,e)- πˆ F] (9) 
This means that a fair effort level satisfies (10): 
  πW(w,efair)- πˆ W = πF(w,efair)- πˆ F (10) 
This fair effort level is strictly increasing in wage w because the worker's surplus payoff is 
rising while the firm's surplus payoff is decreasing in w. The only way to equalize surplus 
payoffs for the worker is to choose e to match efair.69 The question now is whether the worker 
wants to choose efair at all: 
Rearranging (8) depending on the postulated reference effort level efair, the worker's utility is 
(Benjamin, 2006:36): 
⎪⎩
⎪⎨⎧ ≤+−+
>−−−++=
)( if                    ),(~),(~)1(ˆ
)( if   ),(~)1(),(~))1(1(ˆ
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fairFWW
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πφγπφγπ
πγφπγφπ
  (11) 
The first term in (11) is easy to analyse: UW is always decreasing in e, since eewW ∂∂ /),(~π <0 
and >0. Hence a utility maximising worker will always reduce his effort level 
until it reaches efair. The second term in (11) is strictly concave in e (Benjamin, 2006:36). It is 
however only increasing in e until efair if the following condition (12) is met (Benjamin, 
2006:37).
eewF ∂∂ /),(~π
70 
 -(1-φγ)c’(efair) + φγy’(efair) ≥ 0 (12) 
Rearranged, (12) solves for φ (Benjamin, 2006:32): 
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69 For further details see Benjamin (2006:15). 
70 This follows because  
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This means that the utility-maximising worker only increases his effort level until it reaches 
the postulated efair if his personal φ and γ are strong enough. This requires the worker to care 
for fairness for the case that he is better off than the firm. The stipulation of (13) is further 
rather true if the firm's increase in payoff πF from an increase in eW is higher than the worker's 
increase in cost cW form the same increase in effort level eW. Hence on the condition of (13), 
the worker's chosen effort level directly depends on his wage and his reference transaction.71  
To assess whether this is actually the case for the Swiss Air Force pilots, I will merge the 
collected information and theoretical knowledge and proceed by the formulation of adequate 
propositions in the next section. 
3.3. Propositions 
To be able to propose a pilot’s decision-process, I start by evaluating his payoff function 
without considerations of reciprocity. It seems reasonable to assume that also a pilot’s payoff 
function follows (5), as he might like to earn more while bearing smaller costs for the effort 
involved. While wages seem to directly influence the pilot’s benefits, it is more difficult to 
analyse his effort-costs. Apart from the difference in effort-costs for different types of duties, 
there seems to be two more aspects to effort: On the one hand, costs may arise from the way a 
pilot does his duties and on the other hand, they may arise from the amount of time he spends 
for these duties. As the subjective performance evaluation rewards the way the duties are 
performed, it may be assumed that a pilot willingly bears some costs for this kind of effort, 
because this behaviour may maximise his payoff. 
But what about the amount of time a pilot spends on different duties? If no reward is granted 
for this kind of effort because it is actually unobserved, standard incentive theory predicts a 
pilot will bear minimum effort-costs in this sector and hence not work at all.72 But this corner-
solution is unlikely. I believe that even though pilots may have self-control to a great extent, a 
pilot that is never around tends to attract attention. This means that one should not assume 
that duty-time is totally unobserved by superiors. Hence the liberty of a pilot to choose the 
amount of total working time is only true within a certain range. What options are left to help 
                                                 
71 For further details and the firm’s optimal choice of wage see Benjamin (2006). 
72 Due to this gap in LOBE, the performance enhancing effects of such an incentive system might be lost. 
Performance enhancing effects have been shown by e.g. Lazear (2000:1346) for piece rate workers or by e.g. 
Kahn and Sherer (1990:118Sf) for the case of managers in terms of the influence of bonuses on their later 
performance. 
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minimize effort-costs that grant no rewards? The pilot might optimise the different shares of 
duties he performs: Effort-costs for normal duties might be reasonably low, since a pilot likes 
to fly. Effort-costs for time spent on extra duties however appear to be higher than for normal 
duties. Therefore even a substitution of the two kinds of duties implies lower total effort-costs 
for a pilot. According to these considerations, standard incentive theory predicts that a pilot 
chooses a minimum amount of extra duties as soon as he perceives that the additional 
performance of extra duties remains unrewarded.73 Having however seen that the 
performance of extra duties is very important to the firm, considerations for fairness and 
reciprocity might become relevant. Hence a different reasoning may apply. To evaluate this 
issue, I will now make use of the introduced theory by Benjamin (2006). 
                                                
It is important to bear in mind that in Benjamin’s (2006) theory effort comes after wage 
unlike in an incentive theory. But the time spent on extra duties does not influence the 
subjective performance evaluation. Hence wage does not come after this kind of effort. The 
evaluations seem to be rather based on subjectivity, which implies that the pilot probably does 
not fully deserve the wage he earns. If a pilot believes his evaluation depends, at least to some 
extent, on unverifiable reasoning, he might show reciprocity. Hence, effort might come after 
wage as in Benjamin’s (2006) theory.  
To apply considerations of reciprocity, I also have to consider the payoff of the Air Force. 
The payoff of such a governmental organisation is however very difficult to measure. But I 
may assess its production function. The Air Force produces “safety and transportation” as a 
primary product. This of course is mainly done by the performance of normal duties. How 
then do extra duties affect this product? Because the accomplishment of extra duties is 
complementary to normal duties, an additional performance of extra duties should improve 
the productivity of the system. This is the case even if normal duties are substituted as long as 
lack of pilots wanting to perform extra duties prevails. The increased productivity results in a 
better accomplishment of the missions of the Air Force and therewith potentially increases its 
payoff. As I am only going to consider relative changes it suffices to learn that this firm’s 
payoff πW(w,e) is indeed according to (4) increasing in e (the amount of extra duties 
performed) and decreasing in w (the wage of a pilot) because this reduces the available money 
of the Air Force’s limited budget.  
A quick conclusion would now be that a pilot chooses his unobserved effort level, i.e. the 
amount of extra duties he performs, according to his salary. This might be true for the first 
 
73 This situation may be seen as equivalent to the “multi-tasking problem” described by Prendergast (1999:23). 
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two periods of his employment.74 Thereafter further considerations might apply: As discussed 
earlier, part of the subjective performance evaluations, which primarily affect the later wage 
changes of a pilot, might actually not be earned by the way he performed his duties before. 
Based on the subjectivity of the evaluation I therefore make the following important 
assumption: A pilot tries at least to do his job as good as the previous year. Hence he expects 
at least the same evaluation and therefore the same wage increment as before.75 If he chooses 
in the first two periods of his employment a “fair” unobserved effort level, he might thereafter 
always compare the received evaluation to that of the year before.76 Thus, if his expectations 
are met, he exerts the same “fair” unobserved effort level than before.77 This assumption 
might be challenged because a pilot might have tried to perform his duties better than before 
and therefore expect a better evaluation than last year. I, however, believe that even for this 
case he is positively surprised if he actually receives a better evaluation because the superior 
not only appreciated his endeavours although he may not have seen him much, but also 
                                                 
74 The initial “fair” amount of extra duties depends on the reference payoffs the pilot uses for himself and the Air 
Force. They may vary from pilot to pilot as not all pilots have the same education and outside options. Let me 
however assume that he initially chooses to perform this “fair” amount of yearly extra duties (at least in his view, 
which is relevant for this case). 
75 This assumption is motivated by Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1986:730): "The current wage of an 
employee serves as reference for evaluating the fairness of future adjustments of that employee's wage." Also the 
literature about “psychological contracts” supports the importance of expectations (see e.g. Herriot, Manning and 
Kidd 1997). 
76 Albeit he already receives at the end of the first period a subjective performance evaluation, he may not be 
able to judge its fairness as he still lacks a point of reference. 
77 This assumption also takes care of the problem of deferred compensations (Prendergast, 1999:45-49), which 
means that wages in many firms are normally low at the beginning and high at the end of a career. If the fair 
effort level would simply depend on absolute wage like in (10), it would have to follow the rising wage of such a 
compensation system. But deferred compensations are mainly meant to bind a worker to the firm (Prendergast, 
1999: 45). Thus the worker expects these promised compensations and does not change his initially chosen 
yearly effort level as long as the promises are kept. For the case of the Swiss Air Force this would mean that as 
long as “normal” wage increments are granted, the worker performs the same yearly amount of extra duties. 
Further explanations for this phenomenon are given by e.g. Backes-Gellner, Lazear and Wolff (2001:1-72). The 
rising wage of employees may also reflect their internal knowledge and their consequently boosted productivity. 
For the case of the Swiss Air Force I simplify this picture by assuming that a worker, although more productive 
according to his experience level, still bears the same costs to his effort level. 
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choose him for a better evaluation within the forced distribution of all evaluations.78 If the 
pilot however receives a worse evaluation than before, he may be disappointed. 
To implement this dynamic situation into the model, I make use of the reference payoffs: 
I define the reference wage  in the worker’s reference payoff  as the expected 
wage. As there is almost no outside option for the firm for native military aviators, I assume 
that the firm’s reference transaction depends as well on the expected wage.
wˆ )ˆ,ˆ(ˆ ewW ππ ≡
79 I define this 
expected wage  as the pilot’s last wage plus his expected wage increment, which I take to 
be the same as his last wage increment.
wˆ
80 
To be able to assess a fair unobserved effort level in terms of the amount of extra duties 
performed, I also have to define a respective reference effort level ê. Again, neither the firm 
nor the worker has an easily achievable outside option that could be used as a reference 
transaction.81 Hence I rather use the worker’s labour market experience in terms of 
unobserved effort levels inside the firm. For this experience I see two possible alternatives: 
Either I assume that the reference unobserved effort level ê is always the pilot’s last year’s 
unobserved effort level et-1 that reflects his most recent labour market experience inside the 
firm, or his personal standard unobserved effort level es that potentially reflects his initial 
“fair” unobserved effort level inside the firm or his long-term labour market experience.82 
The first version implies that pilots always provide unobserved effort levels in reference to 
previous year; the second version implies that pilots do not especially consider the previous 
year’s unobserved effort level, instead focus on their long-term experience. As we will later 
see, the first version simply proposes that a pilot adapts his unobserved effort level constantly 
to his performance evaluation while the second version entails that a pilot has to be newly 
motivated by surprises every period. Otherwise he settles back to his standard unobserved 
effort level even if he receives constantly very good performance evaluations. For both cases I 
will however only make predictions in relations to previous effort levels.  
the 
                                                 
78 If the superior does not render a better evaluation for this case, the employee might of course be disappointed. 
I am however not able to assess these cases but believe, after having talked to some pilots, that my assumption 
bears some realistic features. 
79 This seems at least probable for the pilot’s point of view that is relevant for this case. 
80 This view is further supported by the study of Mas (2006). The police officers final offer obviously served 
them as a reference point for expected wage. 
81 For the availability of outside options for Swiss Air Force pilots see Hedinger (2004). 
82 These arguments are in line with Benjamin (2006:3) who reasons that the reference transaction may depend on 
current and past market rates and the worker's recent labour market experience. 
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But let me give a more detailed analysis to be able to make propositions for the available data 
of 4 periods of LOBE-Data and 2 periods of extra duty time, to which I will refer to from now 
as “unobserved effort level” e: I start by analysing the simpler case where I assume that the 
worker’s reference effort level is his last year’s unobserved effort level et-1. I show the case 
for my available data in Figure 9 where the x-axis is the timeline with periods t1, t2, t3 and t4.  
 
Figure 9:  The four period application of Benjamin’s (2006) model to the situation of the Swiss Air Force with 
expected wage and reference effort levels as last years unobserved effort level. 
t1 t2 t3 t4 
~ ~ )ˆˆ),(
 
Notes: own drawings 
 
As visualized by a crossed out arrow between each unobserved effort level e and the 
evaluation at the end of a period, it is important to keep in mind that the unobserved effort 
level (the amount of extra duties) does not influence the evaluation at the end of a year and 
therewith the wage in the next year. Let me explain the figure by an example. In period t1 the 
pilot chooses the unobserved effort level according to his appraisal of a fair unobserved effort 
level in reference to wage and working conditions. The superior evaluates the work of this 
pilot in t1 , for instance, as average (independent of last year’s unobserved effort level). This 
directly affects wt2. If this is the first evaluation the pilot receives in his carrier, he most 
probably accepts it and chooses et2 again according to his initial appraisal of a fair unobserved 
effort level. But the evaluation at the end of t1 gives rise to an average expected wage  in 
period t3 because the pilot expects the same evaluation at the end of t2 again. The respective 
3ˆ tw
et2 
eval.t1→wt2 eval.t2→wt3 
)ˆ,ˆ(ˆ),( ewew WWW πππ −≡
 
= )ˆ,ˆ(ˆ),(~ ewFFF ππ ≡ e π−w  
et2 et3 
eval.t2→wt3 
,ˆ( eew WWW πππ −≡ w
 
= )ˆˆ ,ˆ(),(~ eFF πππ −≡ wFew  
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coherence is displayed by the solid arrow. As discussed before, I assume for now that the 
reference effort level êt3 is equivalent to the unobserved effort level et2 as shown by the 
dashed arrow. If in period t2 the superior appreciates the employee’s work more than 
expected, the good evaluation of t2 gives rise to a high wage in period t3 (wt3> ). This wage 
wt3 now enters along the doted arrow the fairness assessment function of the pilot. If in t3, the 
pilot does not change his unobserved effort level but puts forth again e=ê=et-1=et2 (along the 
bold arrow), the surplus payoff for the worker 
3ˆ tw
)ˆ,ˆ(ˆ),(~ ewew WWW πππ −≡
ˆ),(
 is positive because 
πW(w,ê)> πW( ,ê). But the surplus payoff for the firm wˆ )ˆ,ˆ(~ e
4ˆ tw
wFewFF πππ −≡
wˆ
 is negative 
because πF(w,ê)< πF( ,ê). Hence if w> , then efair>et-1 must be true. The worker is 
therefore expected to increase his unobserved effort level in t3 and choose efair > et2 if his 
utility of the second term in (11) is increasing in e. This is the case if (13) holds for these 
particular pilots, which is very plausible because according to chapter two Swiss Air Force 
pilots show high values for φ and γ.
wˆ wˆ
83 If at the end of t3 the employer again renders the same 
good qualification (independent of the unobserved effort level in t3), then wt4= . Hence 
πW(w,ê)= πW( ,ê) and πF(w,ê)= πF( ,ê) if the worker selects again e=ê=et-1. Therefore if 
w= , then efair=et-1.  
wˆ wˆ
wˆ
For the negative case, if in period t3 the expected  is not granted, surplus payoff Wπ~ is 
negative while Fπ~  is positive if the worker chooses the same unobserved effort level e as in 
t2. Hence efair< et-1 is true. As the utility from the first term of (11) is always decreasing in e, 
the worker decreases his unobserved effort level and chooses efair<et2. If at the end of period t3 
again the same evaluation is issued, then w= , and therefore the worker will choose efair=et-1. 
As we can see, the evaluation affects the unobserved effort level in the long run. Every chosen 
unobserved effort level is also the starting point for the path of all of a pilot’s later unobserved 
wˆ
                                                 
83 At least 71% of the pilots in chapter two show values for β that are higher than 0.3. As (13) transforms for β 
into 
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β it all depends on the relationship of y’ and c’. Even though y’ must be high as a 
permanent lack of pilots wanting to perform extra duties persist, I can not make any assumption of whether it is 
higher than the marginal effort-cost for the pilot. High marks for φ and γ seem also supported by two further 
studies: Henrich et al (2001:76) found in their experiments that people who have a high payoff to cooperation in 
their everyday life are more cooperative than others. This might very well apply to pilots. Hennig-Schmidt, 
Rockenbach and Sadrieh (2005:11f) finally found in a laboratory experiment that workers do show reciprocity if 
they are informed about the employer's surplus, which is probably the case for extra duties of pilots. 
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effort levels.84 Hence unobserved the effort levels et1 and et2 are either the unobserved effort 
levels he chose in the first and second period of his employment or have been predetermined 
by the same scheme as et3 and et4 by previous data. These findings are the grounds for my first 
proposition. I will however try to further simplify the coherences to make the proposition 
easier to test in the real life environment of my data. 
I recapitulate that the pilot’s expected wage in t3 is defined by his wage in t2 plus the wage 
increment according to his subjective performance evaluation in t1, i.e. =wt2+f(evalt1). The 
pilots wage in t3 depends on his subjective performance evaluation in t2 and on his wage in t2, 
i.e. wt3=wt2+f(evalt2). Because the surplus payoff of the worker 
3ˆ tw
)ˆ,ˆ(ˆ),(~ 33 ewew
W
t
W
t ππ −≡ 3Wtπ  
positively depends on the difference between wt3 and  it must also positively depend on 
the difference between the last two evaluations (evalt2-evalt1). This means that a change in the 
evaluation from t1 to t2 implies a change in the unobserved effort level from t2 to t3. 
3ˆ tw
In the left column of Figure 10 I try to visualize these circumstances in simple graphs. I show 
in the top left panel on the x-axis the evaluation of t-1. On the y-axis I show the chosen 
unobserved effort level in t. For the previous example this would mean that the pilot in t1 
received a medium evaluation and in t2 choose to apply a medium unobserved effort level that 
draws a first point in, for example, the middle of the graph. At the end of t2 he received a 
better evaluation, hence his expectations are surpassed and he chooses to apply in t3 a higher 
unobserved effort level than in t2. This draws a second point in the graph which is higher and 
more to the right than the first point. In period t4 nothing would happen, as the pilot gets the 
same evaluation and hence chooses to apply the same unobserved effort level as before. If I 
connect these two points, a positive dependence between the last received result of the 
subjective performance evaluation and the chosen unobserved effort level materializes. Even 
though I do not know the exact coherences, I visualize this by a simple linear dependence in 
the top left panel of Figure 10. I am slightly more careful when I formulate the following 
simple proposition: 
 
? Proposition 1: The time a worker spends on unobserved tasks is a function of his most 
recent result of his subjective performance evaluation. 
 
                                                 
84 I do not believe that a pilot strategically chooses his effort level, as it will enter his decision function in the 
next period. I rather believe that he “rewards” fair wages with fair effort levels from period to period. 
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Figure 10: Interdependence of subjective performance evaluations, time and unobserved effort levels. 
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In the second panel of the left column of Figure 10 a critical example for available data is 
displayed: I show a possible course of the results of an individual evaluation. It starts with 3.5 
for the period of 2001, continues with twice an evaluation of 4.5 for 2002 and 2003 and ends 
with an evaluation of 4.0 for the period of 2004. I accordingly predict for the years 2003 and 
2004 the highest unobserved effort level, which I show in the left panel of the third row of 
Figure 10.  
Before turning to the next proposition I give a quick preview of a possible consequence of 
proposition one: If it is confirmed, the motivation problem in the multiple task environment is 
solved. Unobserved tasks are not endangered as they are accomplished by the workers who 
reciprocate the receipt of good subjective performance evaluations. Even though it is up to the 
worker to exert an initially perceived fair unobserved effort level, this implies that in the case 
that unobserved effort levels are too low, the average evaluation may be raised and 
consequently the problem solved. 
I now turn to the analysis of the slightly more complex situation where I use a standard 
unobserved effort level es which stands, for example, for the initial “fair” unobserved effort 
level of an individual pilot. I am going to use it as the reference effort level ê.85 I use Figure 
11 to visualize the situation. The x-axis is again the timeline with periods t1, t2, t3 and t4. The 
two only differences to the already described situation in Figure 9 are the missing dashed 
arrows connecting the unobserved effort level in one period with the reference effort level in 
the next period and the substitution of ê by es in the payoff-formulae. Let me explain the new 
situation by the same examples I used before. If I assume that the pilot chooses in the second 
period et2=es, then no difference appears to the first situation where evalt2 > evalt1, as the pilot 
simply chooses in the third period et3=efair > es= et2. The difference only shows in the fourth 
period: If at the end of period t3 he receives the same evaluation as at the end of t2, then 
wt4= . If in t4, the pilot does not change his unobserved effort level but puts forth again 
e =et3>es, the surplus payoff for the worker 
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positive because πt4F( ,e)>πt4F( ,es). wˆ wˆ
                                                 
85 It is possible that a pilot changes this initial “fair” unobserved effort level as his individual reference 
transactions might change. What is important to consider is the difference to the first case, where the reference 
transaction was simply last year’s unobserved effort level, while in this second case the reference effort level is 
basically independent of last year. 
  48
 Chapter 3: Reciprocity Effects of Subjective Performance Evaluations 
Hence if w= , and et-1>es then efair< et-1 because if w= , then efair=es is always true. As the 
utility from the first term of (11) is always decreasing in e the worker decreases his 
unobserved effort level in t4 and chooses efair<et3. This he does in contrast to the previous case 
where the reference effort level was et-1 and he therefore chose an unobserved effort level 
equivalent to et-1.  
wˆ wˆ
 
Figure 11: The four period application of Benjamin’s (2006) model to the situation of the Swiss Air Force with 
expected wage and reference effort levels as an individual standard unobserved effort level. 
t1 t2 t3 t4 
 
Notes: own drawings 
 
Let me also explain the negative case: The pilot in the third period had chosen et3<es=et2 
because his expectations had been spoiled (evalt2<evalt1). At the end of t3 he receives now the 
same evaluation as at the end of t2, which means wt4= . If in t4, the pilot does not change 
his unobserved effort level but puts forth again e =et3<es, the surplus payoff for the worker 
4ˆ tw
)ˆ,ˆ(ˆ),(~ ewew WWW πππ −≡
ˆ),(
 is positive because πW( ,e)>πW( w ,es). And the surplus payoff for 
the firm 
wˆ ˆ
)ˆ,ˆ(~ ewFewFF πππ −≡  is negative because πF( ,e)<πF( ,es). Hence if w=  and 
et-1<es then efair> et-1 must be true. The worker is therefore expected to increase his 
unobserved effort level in t4 and choose efair= es if the utility of his second term in (11) is 
increasing in e. This is the case if (13) holds for these particular pilots, which is very plausible 
as discussed earlier. Again, the situation is different to the case that the reference effort level 
was ê=et-1. Now the fair unobserved effort level does not so much depend on the path of the 
wˆ wˆ wˆ
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unobserved effort levels in previous periods. If an employee perceives a certain unobserved 
effort level as fair, he only changes it for a short time if his expectations are un-matched. 
Hence this time the predetermination of the unobserved effort level in t2 is less important. 
These findings are the grounds for my second proposition. Again I will try to further simplify 
the coherences to make the proposition easier to test in a real life environment. 
I recapitulate that the worker only exerts higher unobserved effort levels, if his expected wage 
is exceeded and only lower unobserved effort levels if his expectations are belied. If not, he 
does not change or even returns to his standard unobserved effort level es. This means that 
instead of keeping up a high unobserved effort level when he receives consecutive high 
evaluations he quickly accustoms to the good evaluations and chooses again his standard 
unobserved effort level.86 But that also means that he accustoms fast to bad evaluations and 
already in the second period after the deception chooses again his “standard” unobserved 
effort level. 
Figure 10 on page 47 visualizes these circumstances in the right column. In the top right panel 
I show on the x-axis the difference of the last two subjective performance evaluations. On the 
y-axis I show again the unobserved effort level. In my first example a worker in t1 received a 
medium and in t2 a better evaluation. As therefore his expectations were surpassed, he 
chooses in t3 a high unobserved effort level that draws a first point, for example, at the top 
right of the graph. At the end of t3 he received again the same good evaluation. Hence his 
expectations are not surpassed anymore and he chooses in t4 his standard unobserved effort 
level that is lower than et3. This would draw in the graph a second point below and to the left 
of the first point. Connecting these points draws again a direct dependence between the two 
axes. This time however the unobserved effort level depends on the difference of the last two 
subjective performance evaluations and not just on the last evaluation. Even though I draw a 
linear dependence of the two values I am aware of the unknown exact relationship between 
them. I accordingly formulate the second simple proposition for the actual case: 
? Proposition 2: The time a worker spends on unobserved tasks is a function of the 
difference between his most recent subjective performance evaluation and the one 
before that. 
                                                 
86 This assumption is motivated by Gneezy and List (2006:8), who found positive reciprocity to vanish over time 
in a field experiment. The view is further supported by purely psychological papers as e.g. Gilbert et al. (1998) 
who research the "durability bias" as a restricted period of time that negative feelings endure. This could very 
well apply to reciprocity as well. Finally it is an old view expressed by well-known philosophers that we quickly 
accustom to better living standards (see e.g. Schopenhauer, 1922). 
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In the second row of Figure 10 I proceed with the same example of real data as explained 
before: The right panel of row two now shows the differences of the last two results of the 
subjective performance evaluations of the same pilot as in the left panel of row two. As at the 
end of 2002 he received a better evaluation than in 2001, the difference is positive. He hence 
gets a better evaluation as he expected and might show positive reciprocity by a high 
unobserved effort level in 2003. This is displayed in the right panel of row three. At the end of 
2003 however he received an evaluation that was at the same level than before and therefore 
as expected, hence he is not positively surprised and does not show an especially high 
unobserved effort level in 2004. He therefore exerts a lower unobserved effort level than 
in 2003. 
With this proposition the question of the multi-tasking problem remains partly unanswered. If 
it is confirmed, I might be able to predict who is increasing and who is decreasing his level of 
unobserved effort for one period. It does, however, not seem as if the workers are motivated 
over a longer period by the subjective performance evaluations to provide more than their 
usual level of unobserved effort. 
Comparing both propositions, it seems possible that both of them may get confirmed: If the 
first proposition augments the standard unobserved effort level, the pilot in Figure 10 might 
spare no unobserved effort in 2003 and apply a high effort level in 2004, which is higher than 
the one in 2002. 
As mentioned before, for the Swiss Air Force pilots I consider extra duties as unobserved 
effort not only because they seem to be unobserved but also because they seem to be the 
perfect field for reciprocity. Because the performance of normal duties is also unobserved, I 
now turn to the question whether the pilots perform extra duties additionally to their other 
duties, or if they substitute extra for normal duty. For the case that they want to perform less 
extra duties, I already answered the question, as pilots may not be able to perform less than a 
certain amount of total duty. For the case that they want to perform more extra duties, the 
pilots have two options: Either they bear the full marginal costs of extra duties if they do them 
additionally or they just bear the difference between the marginal costs of extra and normal 
duties if they substitute one for the other. Substitution may therefore only be sub-optimal if 
the marginal costs for normal duties are negative. Even though it is possible that pilots enjoy 
flying a lot for the first hour it seems very probable that they enjoy the marginal flying-hour 
less than the first one. Consequently also for normal duties, the marginal costs must be 
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positive. Hence pleased pilots are expected to do more extra duties but not more total duties. I 
therefore propose the following: 
? Proposition 3: Pilots perform additional unobserved tasks by substituting extra duties 
for normal duties and not by performing the extra duties additionally. 
To test the three stated predictions I use a unique dataset of Swiss Air Force pilots’ 
engagements and subjective performance evaluations. 
3.4. Empirical Analysis 
3.4.1 Data 
I collected my data by combining individual datasets: Swiss Air Force pilots have been 
required to state the nature of what they do on a daily basis. Each evening they complete one 
column in an individual excel-sheet by declaring the number of hours they have worked on 
different tasks. Since these data are purely self-declarative for military statistical use, there is 
no reason to assume that the reports are biased. The data were furthermore not available to 
direct superiors! This is a very lucky situation for a researcher as I consider the amount of 
hours spent on extra duties as truly unobserved by the direct superior. I however am in the 
possession of all the numbers and can therefore test my predictions. 
For my analysis I use the datasets starting with November 2002. The subjective performance 
evaluation system that had been introduced two years earlier only then became wage 
effective.87 Due to the introduction of a new IT-solution that had some problems in the 
beginning, a lot of data were lost in 2005. Consequently, I limit my observation period by 
October 2004 with the end of an evaluation period. After transforming the data of the 
available excel-files into the statistics program Stata, I generated missing values if pilots 
claimed to work more than 24 or less than 0 hours a day, which presumably had to be typing 
errors. I furthermore deleted pilots who only formally filled out their excel-sheets with a daily 
8.5 hours.88 Moreover for certain duties I had to generate hourly figures from daily data. For 
example, a singular day-off was generated as 8.5 hours free time, reflecting the standard daily 
                                                 
87 It actually became wage effective by January 2003. I consider November 2002 the more interesting date as the 
employees then had received their evaluations and therefore could already be happy or disappointed about their 
next year's salary.  
88 According to tests this removal does not influence the later findings. 
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working requirement of similar jobs in the government.89 As the pilots had to submit a 
monthly excel-sheet to headquarters, on a few occasions a whole month was missing.90 To 
correct for this circumstance I collapsed the daily data into monthly data and generated 
missing values for months with sums of zero working and off-duty time. I then generated a 
yearly mean for monthly working hours for each evaluation period.91 This means my first 
period starts by November 2002 and ends by October 2003 and my second period covers 
November 2003 until October 2004. Next I combined all normal-duty and all extra-duty 
variables into two single variables. The complete list of duties is provided in Table 21 in the 
appendix. A test for correct affiliation will be discussed in the results section of this chapter. 
The descriptive statistics of all variables are displayed in Table 6. For the later analysis I use 
the 96 pilots for whom I have a full set of observations available and also data on their 
personal LOBE-evaluations for the periods 2001, 2002, 2003 and 2004.92 According to the 
shape of these LOBE data displayed in Table 6 I believe that corner-solutions should not pose 
a problem for the further analysis, as evaluations of 1 or 5 have never been awarded. For the 
later analysis, I generated three different LOBE variables: As shown in Table 7, I first 
combined the topical working hours with the LOBE-evaluation received at the end of such a 
period and called it LOBE. Then I combined the topical data with the LOBE-evaluation 
received in the period t-1 (LOBElag). I finally combined the topical working data with the 
difference of the last two evaluations and called it LOBElagdelta.93 The descriptive statistics 
                                                 
89 I also replaced a day by the individual average of working hours. This did not affect any of the later results. 
90 I furthermore found pilots who did not take great care in filing the excel-forms and most probably forgot to fill 
in half of the month. I therefore also turned all those into missing values who declared in less than 75% of the 
time what they were doing (including days off or sick leave). 
91 This helps me to state correct (conservative) standard errors in the empirical analysis as I only have one 
evaluation per year as opposed to per month or day.  
92 During the critical period approximately 200 pilots have been employed by the Swiss Armed Forces. Some of 
the pilots have however been working in other branches than the Air Force, some have been retired and some 
only hired in the critical period. At the end of 2005, the former command of all professional pilots has been 
suspended and all pilots have been reassigned to different airbases. Before that happened, I was provided with all 
the available data by the commander himself. Today it is very difficult to track the reasons of why specific data 
is missing. It seems however very likely that it is missing on a random basis and should therefore not affect the 
representative quality of the later findings. 
93 For further details see . Table 7
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in Table 6 show that I should have enough variance in my data to perform reasonable 
regression-analyses.94 
 
Table 6: Descriptive Statistics. 
Variable Year Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Description
Extra Duty 03 96 42.664 31.290 0.000 155.917 The average of monthly 
04 96 52.404 31.236 6.000 167.000 extra hours worked over
one qualifciation period
Normal Duty 03 96 107.228 29.981 33.889 160.542 The average of monthly 
04 96 95.967 29.640 5.400 145.200 nornal hours worked over
one qualifciation period
Delta Extra Duty 04 96 9.740 22.113 -51.083 93.677 Difference between Extra
Duty 04 and 03
Delta Normal Duty 04 96 -11.260 26.579 -86.173 74.042 Difference between Normal
Duty 04 and 03
LOBE value 01 96 3.408 0.376 2.700 4.200 LOBE-Evaluation
02 96 3.299 0.283 2.800 4.100 at the end of a qualification
03 96 3.319 0.267 3.000 4.000 period 
04 96 3.341 0.248 2.600 4.100
LOBElag value 02 96 3.408 0.376 2.700 4.200 LOBE-Evaluation
03 96 3.299 0.283 2.800 4.100 of the last period (t-1)
04 96 3.319 0.267 3.000 4.000 (LOBElag02=LOBE01)
LOBElagdelta 03 96 -0.109 0.314 -1.000 0.500 Difference of last two LOBE
04 96 0.020 0.180 -0.400 0.500 Eval.   (LOBElagdelta03
           = LOBE02-LOBE01)
Wage bracket 03 96 23.792 2.271 17.000 28.000 The wage bracket of a worker
04 96 24.667 1.185 24.000 29.000
Notes:
Source: own calculations based on data provided by the Swiss Air Force.  
 
Table 7: Further Descriptions. 
Period Variable Name Formula Description
Evaluation Extra Duty The average of monthly hours worked on extra duties between November 2002 and October 2003
Year 03 Normal Duty The average of monthly hours worked on normal duties between November 2002 and October 2003
(Nov 02 LOBE LOBE03 The LOBE-evaluation received by October 2003
 - Okt 03) LOBElag LOBE02 The LOBE-evaluation received by October 2002
LOBElagdelta LOBE02-LOBE01 The Difference between the LOBE-evaluation received by October 2002 and October 2001
Evaluation Extra Duty The average of monthly extra hours worked between November 2003 and October 2004
Year 04 Normal Duty The average of monthly hours worked on normal duties between November 2003 and October 2004
(Nov 03 LOBE LOBE04 The LOBE-evaluation received by October 2004
 - Okt 04) LOBElag LOBE03 The LOBE-evaluation received by October 2003
LOBElagdelta LOBE03-LOBE02 The Difference between the LOBE-evaluation received by October 2003 and October 2002
Delta Extra Duty Extra04-Extra03 The Difference between the time spent on EXTRA duties in Nov 03-Oct 04 and in Nov 04 - Oct 03.
Delta Normal Duty Normal04-Normal03 The Difference between the time spent on NORMAL duties in Nov 03-Oct 04 and in Nov 04 - Oct 03.
Notes:
Source: own describtions based on data provided by the Swiss Air Force.  
                                                 
94 As I am going to use fixed effects regression techniques it is critical that my data bears inter temporal 
differences. This should be the case as later shown in  - . Out of the 96 pilots I have only 35 
with zero differences in LOBElag between 2004 and 2003 and only 17 with zero differences in LOBElagdelta 
between 2004 and 2003. Finally there are no pilots that performed in 2003 and 2004 the same amount of extra 
duties. 
Figure 12 Figure 14
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3.4.2 Analysis 
Before testing the propositions I have to assess whether performing higher “unobserved effort 
levels”, i.e. working more extra duty time, does not indeed improve the subjective 
performance evaluation of a pilot. If it would, extra duty time could not be regarded as 
“unobserved effort”. To test whether the amount of performed duty influences the subjective 
performance evaluation, particularly extra duty, I regress the evaluation on the average 
monthly hours spent for normal and extra duties. The formal statistical analysis, corrected for 
clustering, can be found in the first column of Table 8.  
 
Table 8: Regressions of the effects of different duties on the later subjective 
performance evaluation LOBE. 
LOBE OLS Fixed Effects OLS Fixed Effects
Full Set Full Set Restricted Set Restricted Set
of Observations of Observations of Observations of Observations
Normal duty -0.001  0.000  0.001  0.000  
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Extra duty 0.002 ** -0.001  0.003 *** -0.002  
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Nov03-Okt04 -0.033  0.036 * -0.006  0.044 *
(0.024) (0.021) (0.028) (0.026)
const 0.002 ** 3.306 *** 3.114 *** 3.262 ***
(0.001) (0.132) (0.149) (0.132)
adj. R2 0.1775 0.7004 0.1408 0.5953
(within) 0.0394 0.0490
n  271  271  192  192
clusters  150 150 96  96 
Notes:
Dependent variable: Qualification Rating
Coefficient of OLS and Fixed-Effects regression 
(Robust standard errors in parentheses, OLS adjusted for clustering)
Level of sign.: ***:p<=0.01,**: 0.01<p<=0.05, *:p<=0.10
Source: own calculations based on Swiss Air Force data.  
 
I also include a dummy for the second evaluation period from November 2003 until October 
2004 to prevent external influences from biasing my regression. The base-group is the 
evaluation period from November 2002 until October 2003. According to these results 
working on average one more hour per month on extra duties actually increases the LOBE-
evaluation of a pilot by 0.002 points. This preliminary result seems to overthrow the basis for 
my propositions. It does not however make use of the panel nature of my dataset. While I 
want to know whether persons receive a better subjective performance evaluation because 
they work more extra duty time, the results could as well mean that persons working more 
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extra duty time are the same that receive on average a better subjective performance 
evaluation, but due to other reasons. It is consequently critical to the analysis to make inter-
temporal regressions. Such a more stringent statistical analysis can be found in the second 
column of Table 8 where I proceed with a fixed-effect regression. I again include a dummy 
for the second evaluation period to allow for annual changes. The effect of extra-duty-hours 
on the LOBE-evaluation at the end of a period becomes statistically insignificant and even 
changes its direction (see column two in Table 8).95 Hence I cannot reject the hypothesis that 
the hours spent on extra duties do not influence the LOBE-evaluation of an individual pilot. 
As for the further analyses I am going to use a sub-sample of the pilots due to data-
availability, I re-run the same regressions for the sub-sample and display the results in the 
third and fourth column of Table 8. The results are unchanged.96 Therefore the underlying 
condition that the unobserved effort level does not increase the subjective performance 
evaluation seems to be met in the case of extra duties. I postpone any further interpretation of 
the results to the end of this section. 
I now proceed and assess my first proposition. A graphical analysis of the relationship 
between the received subjective performance evaluation and the amount of time spent for 
extra duties thereafter is presented in Figure 12. On the x-axis I display the LOBE-evaluation 
of the last year (LOBElag) and on the y-axis the mean monthly amount of performed extra 
duties this year. The fitted values suggest a linear combination of the two effects. So I regress 
the effect of last year's result of the subjective performance evaluation on the hours a pilot 
works on extra duties per month and correct for salary effects caused by management 
positions by including the wage bracket of the pilot. The results of a standard OLS regression 
with cluster analysis and the compulsory dummy-variable for the second evaluation period are 
displayed in column one of Table 9. According to this result it seems as if pilots exert many 
extra duties if they receive a good subjective performance evaluation. But the result may be 
biased in a similar way as the OLS regression of the effect of extra duty on the LOBE-
evaluation before. To make sure that only a change in the LOBE-evaluation is relevant for my 
analysis, I proceed by using fixed-effects regression techniques. 
                                                 
95 As I report the full R2 of the regression, which is fairly high due to explanative power of the fixed effects, I 
also include the “within R2” which shows that the remaining estimators are not able to explain much of the 
variance in the data. 
96 To further test this issue I run the same two regressions with only those pilots who had different LOBE-values 
for the years 2003 and 2004. The results remain almost the same. Even the significance of the estimator for 
extra-duty in the OLS regression only changes by a mere 0.1%. 
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Figure 12: Interdependence of the last subjective performance evaluation and 
unobserved effort level. 
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Notes: Source: own calculations based on data by Swiss Air Force. 
 
 
Table 9: Regression of the effect of the last evaluation LOBE on the mean monthly extra duty time. 
Extra duty OLS Fixed Effects OLS Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Fixed Effects
monthly hours standard errors weighted for
adusted for clusters 1/var & month/12
LOBElag 33.569 *** 16.512  
(9.169) (12.409)
LOBElagdelta 10.817 * 14.004 ** 14.004 * 7.189 *
(5.981) (5.577) (7.937) (4.284)
Wage bracket 7.467 *** 2.081 * 9.860 *** 2.222 ** 2.222 ** 1.729  
(1.300) (1.136) (1.501) (1.110) (0.930) (1.070)
Nov03-Okt04 2.542  7.592 *** -0.280  5.994 ** 5.994  5.023 ***
(2.602) (2.442) (2.914) (2.493) (3.955) (1.790)
const -245.720 *** -61.324  -190.748 *** -8.667  -8.667  -24.329  
(35.056) (48.584) (35.242) (26.448) (21.238) (21.182)
adj. R2 0.4069 0.7626 0.3474 0.7735 0.7735 0.9062
n  192 192 192  192  192  185
clusters  96  96 96 96 96  96 
Notes:
Dependent variable: yearly mean of monthly extra hours
Coefficient of OLS and Fixed-Effects regression 
(Robust standard errors in parentheses, OLS adjusted for clustering)
Level of sign.: ***:p<=0.01,**: 0.01<p<=0.05, *:p<=0.10
Source: own calculations based on Swiss Air Force data.  
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The graphical analysis of this method is easy: I just compare the effects of the differences in 
one variable to the differences in the other variable. Figure 13 does this and displays the 
difference between the last received LOBE-evaluation and the one before that on the x-axis 
and the difference between the amounts of performed extra-duty this and last year on the y-
axis. In this way I can assess whether a change in the evaluation influences the pilot to change 
his behaviour. Figure 13 draws a less clear picture than Figure 12.  
 
Figure 13: Interdependence of the difference between the last two subjective performance 
evaluations and the difference between the actual and the last unobserved effort levels. 
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Notes: Source: own calculations based on data by Swiss Air Force. 
 
The fitted values do not show a positive linear relationship between the variables on the two 
axes. This graphical analysis is confirmed by an analogue fixed effects regression with a 
periodical dummy in column two of Table 9.97 Even though the coefficient points in the right 
direction, according to large standard errors I must reject the hypothesis that a pilot executes 
                                                 
97 To further test this issue and render the OLS and the Fixed-Effects regressions comparable, I rerun the OLS 
regression of the first column of  with only those pilots who had different LOBElag-values for the years 
2003 and 2004. This time the results of the OLS regression change slightly, but extra-duty remains significant at 
the 5% level. Hence it is not the sample selection but truly the method that change the results of the two 
regressions. 
Table 9
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more extra duties if he receives a better subjective performance evaluation, which would have 
reflected the left side of Figure 10 on page 47.98 Only the wage bracket remains relevant, as 
pilots who attain a higher hierarchical position and therefore enter a higher salary-class seem 
to work more on extra duties afterwards.  
? Result 1: The time a pilot spends on extra-duties is not a function of the result of his 
most recent subjective performance evaluation. 
To further understand these issues I proceed by analysing my second proposition. To test 
whether the difference between the last two LOBE evaluations, namely LOBElagdelta, 
influences the amount of extra duties a pilot performs, I start by a graphical analysis: To make 
intra-personal comparisons only, I apply again in Figure 14 my “graphical fixed effects 
regression”.  
 
Figure 14: Interdependence of the difference of the difference of the last two subjective 
performance evaluations and the difference of the difference between the actual  
and the last unobserved effort levels. 
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98 The difference in the labelling of the x and y axis of  in reference to Fi  on page 47 are caused 
by the graphical analysis of the fixed effects method. 
Figure 13 gure 10
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The y-axis is again the difference between the amounts of extra duties performed this year and 
the year before. On the x-axis I however use the difference between the LOBElagdelta of this 
year and the one of last year.99 The fitted values in Figure 14 hint at a positive linear 
combination of the two axes. This means that an increase in LOBElagdelta results in an 
increase in the performed extra duties. To more sophisticatedly test this picture I run a OLS 
and a fixed effects regression with the average time spent on extra duties as the dependent 
variable and the difference of the last two subjective performance evaluations (LOBElagdelta) 
as the explanatory variable. The third and the fourth column of Table 9 show the results. This 
time the proposition seems to be confirmed for both cases. I find a statistically significant 
effect of the difference of the last two subjective performance evaluations on extra duties. 
According to these regressions I cannot reject the null-hypothesis that pilots perform more 
extra duties if they receive a better subjective performance evaluation than before. In the case 
of the fixed effects regression, the statistical significance level is 1.4%. These results are 
astonishing all the more as the first proposition has not been supported. Thus they solely 
encourage the view expressed in the right panels of Figure 10 on page 47.  
? Result 2: The time a pilot spends on extra-duties is a function of the difference 
between his most recent subjective performance evaluation and the previous one. 
Due to the importance of this result I run three further tests: First I adjust the standard errors 
in the regression for clustering on the individuals.100 According to the fifth column of Table 9 
my findings are only slightly less significant. Second I address the construction of my 
dependent variable. As it is an average value I use the inverse variance of all the monthly 
values to weigh my regression. As furthermore some of these months are missing, I combine 
the weighing-factor with a factor that indicates the number of available months as a fraction 
of 12. This should render my regression trustworthier because observations based on big 
variances and observations based on few months are treated as less important than others. The 
sixth column in Table 9 shows that again my result remains significant at the 10% level. I lose 
some observations in this regression because some average values for monthly extra duties 
are zero and therefore without variances. As a third test I assess whether these results are 
critical to the affiliation of the tasks in Table 21 (see appendix). Thus I change the affiliation 
of every single task by deleting it from his original category and adding it to the opposite 
category. Then I re-run the regression of row four in Table 9. Table 10 shows the six for my 
                                                 
99 This is in fact the difference between the differences between the last two LOBElag-values. 
100 With the use of adjusted standard errors, I prevent them to be too small for the case that the error-term is 
correlated within the observations of an individual pilot. 
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analysis critical tasks and their exact nature. If I change any of the tasks in the first section of 
the table from being part of normal duty to being part of extra duty, the statistical significance 
of the results of Table 9 deteriorates as shown in Table 10 to either below 5% or even below 
10%. For the case of the extra duties, only one task is critical. The test is supportive as I can 
see that all the duties in Table 10 are clearly defined to belong to either normal flying duties 
or extra duties by their very nature. 
 
Table 10: The six critical tasks for the analysis. 
Regression results LOBElag 14.004 ** original regression
(Table 4) (5.577)
removed from normal duties Description
added to extra duties
bmpsausbil~g LOBElag 12.986 * professional pilot school
(6.867) as student
flgezgdrlt~g LOBElag 10.702 * flights for
(6.279) third parties
flugdienst~g LOBElag 14.025 * individual 
(7.138) flight training
wau LOBElag 8.158  advanced
(6.315) flight training
spukspugin~n LOBElag 6.846  flight instructor
(6.235) for advanced training
flugdienstit LOBElag 6.263  other individual 
(6.639) flight training
removed from extra duties Description
added to normal duties
einsatzkos~o LOBElag -4.403  voluntary mission abroad
(4.919) as peace support
Notes:
Critical Coefficient for LOBElag of Fixed-Effects regression 
after changing the category of every single variable.
Dependent variable: yearly mean of monthly extra hours
(Robust standard errors in parentheses).
Level of sign.: ***:p<=0.01,**: 0.01<p<=0.05, *:p<=0.10
Source: own calculations based on Swiss Air Force data.  
 
It could only be argued that voluntary peace support missions, which actually consist of flying 
helicopters over the Balkans, do belong to the normal duties of a pilot. This duty is however 
voluntary (Swiss Government, 1995:21, Art.66 and Schindler, 1997:170) and it seems from 
year to year more difficult to find enough pilots to operate the helicopters the Swiss Air Force 
stationed in the Balkans. In 2006 it was even decided to reduce the crew ratio to a mere one 
crew per helicopter to cope with the problem. Hence Balkan-duty seems to me a perfect field 
for reciprocity. 
Before making any further conclusions I test the third proposition, i.e. whether there is a 
substitution effect of extra for normal duties. To assess this proposition I simply estimate the 
effect of the differences of the mean monthly hours spent for extra duties on the differences of 
  61
 Chapter 3: Reciprocity Effects of Subjective Performance Evaluations 
the hours spent for total and normal duties. Table 11 displays the simple OLS-regression 
results. As I already use the differences, a yearly dummy is obsolete and an ability-bias may 
be excluded. Both columns in Table 11 bear significant results that logically add up to one. 
According to the point estimates in Table 11 a pilot who works one additional extra-duty 
hour, does this by working 19 minutes additionally and by substituting 41 minutes of normal 
duty-time. 
 
Table 11: Regression of the difference in extra duties on the difference 
in total/normal duties (yearly monthly means). 
OLS Delta Delta
Total duty Normal duty
Delta 0.321 *** -0.679 ***
extra duty (0.102) (0.102)
const -4.647 * -4.647 *
(2.461) (2.461)
adj. R2 0.0852 0.3119
n   96   96
Notes:
Dependent variable: Difference in yearly mean of monthly total and normal hours (04-03)
Coefficient of OLS  regressions
(Robust standard errors in parentheses, OLS adjusted for clustering)
Level of sign.: ***:p<=0.01,**: 0.01<p<=0.05, *:p<=0.10
Source: own calculations based on Swiss Air Force data.  
 
I hence cannot reject that an increase of the amount of extra duties performed does result in an 
increase of total time worked. But I can neither reject that an increase in the amount of extra 
duties performed does result in a decrease of normal duties performed. I infer that a 
substitution of extra for normal duties and an increase of total duties occur. 
? Result 3: If a pilot performs more extra duties, he does this by substituting some extra 
duties for normal duties and by performing some extra duties additionally.  
I round up this section by combining the empirical findings in one single line of 
argumentation: If a pilot performs more extra duties than last year, he does not necessarily get 
a better subjective performance evaluation according to the fixed effects estimations in Table 
8. Hence the amount of time a pilot spends on extra duties may be considered as unobserved 
effort. If, however, he receives a better subjective performance evaluation than last year, he is 
very likely to work more on extra duties and therewith show reciprocity by unobserved effort. 
According to the fixed effects estimations in Table 9 he does so for every 0.1 points of his 
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evaluation for 1.4 monthly hours. If he receives a continuous high evaluation, according to the 
results in the second column of Table 9, he settles back to his standard unobserved effort level 
without exerting any additional extra duty anymore. The results of the OLS-estimations in 
Table 8 finally point towards the fact that pilots who always exert high unobserved effort 
levels seem to receive better subjective performance evaluations altogether, but not 
necessarily so after an especially high unobserved effort level. It may seem plausible to 
assume that the same pilots trigger the results of the first OLS-estimation in Table 9, even 
though they do not do this because they receive good subjective performance evaluations. 
Hence a standard omitted variable bias may exist which is avoided by using fixed effects 
regression techniques (Wooldridge, 2003:485). 
Comparing now the power of prediction of standard incentive theory and theories of 
reciprocity I believe that standard incentive theory for multi-tasking has difficulties in 
explaining the above results. Furthermore its prediction that extra duty vanishes over time as 
pilots might notice the gap in the incentive system is not supported. The descriptive analysis 
of the difference in the yearly extra duties (Delta Extra Duty) in Table 6 shows that in the 
evaluation period between November 2003 and October 2004 more extra duties have been 
performed as in the period before. This means that the accomplishment of extra duties does 
not vanish over time in my data. However, theories of reciprocity are also not able to fully 
predict the performance of extra duties. Proposition One has not been confirmed. But theories 
of reciprocity are able to explain at least the dynamic side of my findings. They are able to 
predict who is exerting a higher unobserved effort level and who is exerting a lower 
unobserved effort level than last year. But initial unobserved effort levels seem to depend 
mainly on the general perception of a fair salary and possibly fair working conditions. 
Furthermore it appears as if the pilots receiving on average the better results of their 
subjective performance evaluations are the ones performing most extra duties, even though 
they do not seem to be motivated by considerations of reciprocity. 
3.5. Conclusions 
Over the last few years many insights have been gained into incentive systems for workers for 
whom output measures are easily observed (Prendergast, 1999:57). Data has however been 
difficult to achieve for systems with an output less easy to measure. The applied subjective 
performance evaluations have therefore only been scarcely researched. In the meantime, 
newly developing literature with mostly theoretical and experimental papers has shown that 
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many people do not care for only their individual profit maximization according to 
neoclassical models but also for fairness. As subjective performance evaluations are made by 
human beings and not by a standard piece-rate formula, it seems possible that these 
evaluations may be appreciated and remunerated by reciprocal employees. Merging a unique 
firm level dataset of operational data with performance evaluations I thus tried to find out 
whether changes in subjective performance evaluations induce reciprocity in the field of 
unobserved efforts. I further researched whether such effects last over time and if they may 
even resolve the problem of optimal effort allocation to unobserved tasks. 
My major findings support theories of reciprocity since the subjective performance evaluation 
has the following effect on behaviour: If pilots receive a better subjective performance 
evaluation than before, they perform higher levels of unobserved effort in the next period. If 
they receive a worse evaluation than before, they perform lower levels of unobserved effort 
than in the preceding period. This behaviour does not however last. I only find results for the 
period right after a change in the subjective performance evaluation. This means that pilots 
slip back to a normal level of unobserved effort if their now adapted expectations are met, 
even if the expectations are at a high or low level. Hence the effects of reciprocity do not 
achieve a sustained success in motivating the pilots to perform unobserved tasks. The effects 
are short lived. All the same, time spent on unobserved tasks does not vanish over the years. It 
seems thus probable that a pilot chooses a certain level of unobserved effort that he perceives 
as fair and thereafter only changes it for a short time if his expectations are not met or 
exceeded.  
These findings shed light on three issues: First it appears as if standard incentive theory is not 
able to explain the chosen allocation of effort in an environment with subjective performance 
evaluations and multiple tasks of which parts are unobservable. Even if the incentive system 
has a gap, appropriate working conditions and the fairness of the workers may ensure the 
performance of unobserved tasks at a certain level. Second, the subjectivity of subjective 
performance evaluations seems to matter. If the evaluation is changed, the worker is either 
thrilled or disappointed. He then changes his chosen unobserved effort level according to the 
degree to which his expectations are exceeded. Hence, reciprocity indeed plays a role. Third it 
appears as if expectations adapt very quickly to new situations. These expectations not only 
cover absolute salary but even salary changes. Thus, even high salary rises might become 
expected and for this reason normal. 
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If accordingly workers in complex professions should be motivated by reciprocity to provide 
effort beyond normal levels, an exponential wage path would have to be applied. And even 
then, as soon as their expectations adapt, the additional effort levels might vanish.101 
Consequently the use of wage effective incentive systems should be reconsidered in 
professions where effort is difficult to measure.102  
Whether it at least helps to employ workers that have strong positive reciprocal preferences 
will show the next chapter. I will research whether the experimentally found strong, though 
still varying, positive reciprocity of the pilots in chapter two predicts their real reciprocal 
behaviour towards the Air Force. 
 
 
 
101 And what about bonus payments? Bellmare and Shearer (2007:17) find for example that tree planters 
reciprocate a gift given on one day with extra high effort levels. These high effort levels than vanish over the 
next few days without a tendency to go below the original level. This means that no other gift has been expected. 
In the long run, it seems however unlikely that the mere fact that bonus payments are possible in a certain firm 
does not raise expectations. Therefore also bonus payments are not a lasting solution to the problem. 
102 Already Prendergast (1999:30) reports that many managers disconnect evaluations from wage altogether to 
avoid the endangerment of the good prolonged relationship of employers and employees. 
CHAPTER 4:  
 
 
Reciprocity at Work 
Evidence from matched experimental and personnel 
data. 
4.1. Introduction 
It has been long recognized that social preferences, in particular that of reciprocity, can have 
profound implications for internal labour market relations (Akerlof and Yellen, 1986).103 
Indeed, evidence from laboratory experiments demonstrates large effects of social preferences 
on the behaviour of its participants.104 Nevertheless, many economists question its 
applicability to, or its significance for, the real-life workplace (e.g. Harrison and List, 
2004:1009f; Levitt and List, 2007; Gneezy and List, 2006). Either they claim that the subjects 
in experiments are mostly students, who do not necessarily represent accurately the behaviour 
                                                 
103 There is a growing literature of many different theoretical approaches that all support the idea that people not 
only act to enhance their own material well-being but also use costly actions to equalize the distribution of final 
payoffs (Akerlof, 1982; Akerlof and Yellen, 1988 and 1990; Levine, 1998; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Falk and 
Fischbacher, 2000; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Charness and Rabin, 2002; Camerer and Fehr, 2006). It is not of 
my concern whether it is just inequality aversion or indeed the urge to reward and revenge as I will not 
distinguish the different theories but take it as given that reciprocal actions are proposed. 
104 See e.g. Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl (1993), Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995), Fehr, Gachter and 
Kirchsteiger (1997), Fehr and Falk (1999), Fehr and Gachter (2000b), Falk and Gachter (2002), Andreoni, 
Harbaugh and Vesterlund (2003), Fehr and Schmidt (2004), Fehr and List (2004), Charness (2004) and Gachter, 
Kessler and Koenigstein (2006). 
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of workers (Fehr and List, 2004; Carpenter, Burks and Verhoogen, 2005) 105 or that the 
settings do not resemble sufficiently enough real life situations (Kube, Maréchal and Puppe, 
2006). Dohmen et al. (2006:11), for instance, find that students – the typical subjects in 
experiments - are in these settings less reciprocal than the general population. And Lazear, 
Malmendier and Weber (2005) also found experimental results to be biased because real 
people self-select into different settings.106 But how is it possible to determine whether 
reciprocity plays an actual role in real labour markets? Up to now, there have been three other 
commonly used avenues of research: Surveys, field experiments and the analysis of real-life 
data, all of which have their own advantages and disadvantages. Surveys, as a common 
alternative to experiments are not only based on students, but also lack the other problem of 
credibility: A person might claim one thing and do another. Field experiments seem to be a 
valuable alternative to construct real life situations (List, 2007). These three studies 
manipulate the ‘kindness of the wage’ (Gneezy and List, 2006; Kube, Maréchal and Puppe, 
2006; Bellmare and Shearer, 2007).107 The design of these experiments is set up to examine 
the "pure" form of reciprocity in one-shot interactions without any scope of a long-run 
relationship. Removing concerns for reputation is important, otherwise even strictly selfish 
individuals may have an incentive to mimic reciprocal behaviour to reduce the danger of 
being replaced (Brown, Falk and Fehr, 2004). Consistent with the experimental evidence 
(e.g., Falk and Gachter, 2003), these papers find only moderate effects of reciprocity on 
behaviour. Real life data finally, if possible to gather at all, are always influenced by many 
factors researchers are not able to control nor even grasp. Hence it is difficult to tell whether 
the observed phenomena are really based on individual reciprocity or whether other 
environmental factors in addition to reputational considerations trigger the behaviour.108 
                                                 
105 The most critic received experiments with students majoring in economics as they have been shown to behave 
differently compared to other students (Carter and Irons, 1991; Frank, Gilovich and Regan, 1993). Furthermore 
Bellmare and Kroeger (2005) compared students’ decisions in an investment game with those of subjects of a 
representative panel in Denmark. They found that students' decisions are only to a limited extent representative 
for the population (p.8). 
106 The same line of argument follow Eriksson and Villeval (2004), Dohmen and Falk (2006) and Eriksson, 
Teyssier and Villeval (2006). 
107 Gneezy and List (2006) and Kube, Maréchal and Puppe (2006) employed students to computerize the 
holdings of small libraries and (only Gneezy and List, 2006) to take part in a door-to-door fundraising drive. 
Bellmare and Sherer (2007) granted tree planters a salary increase for only one day. 
108 Some studies are Katz, Kochan and Gobeille (1983), Cappelli and Chauvin (1991), Kleiner, Leonard and 
Pilarski (2002), Bartel et al. (2004), Mas (2004), Krueger and Mas (2004) and Mas (2006). 
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In this chapter I will try to address these problems by treading a new path of research: I will 
match experimental findings of reciprocity with real-life data.109 I use the measurements of 
reciprocity obtained by laboratory experiments among employees of a large organization (see 
chapter two) and compare individual values for reciprocity to the apparent reciprocal 
behaviour of the same employees over a two-year period in a real labour market situation (see 
chapter three). This provides me with an opportunity to examine whether the behaviour 
observed in the workplace is indeed based on reciprocity as measured in experiments. Thus, 
my strategy is to measure reciprocity in a one-shot experiment, where reputation plays no 
role, and to examine whether this predicts the differences in behaviour within the workplace 
that cannot be explained by reputational concerns. Therefore, rather than manipulating the 
environment in the workplace, I use naturally occurring changes in the workplace and 
examine whether individual differences in reciprocity predict the response to these 
changes.  
For the experiments, I use the so-called “moon lighting game” (Abbink, Irlenbusch and 
Renner, 2000). It puts the subject into a position where he or she has to choose whether to 
reward or punish a friendly and an unfriendly action. 
110
Consequently I am able to measure both, 
s 
pects 
                                                
positive and negative reciprocity in the experiments. 
To measure the behaviour of my experimental subjects in the workplace, I make use of it
specific setting. The subjects, like myself, are pilots of the Swiss Air Force, a multi-task 
environment with subjective performance evaluations. These evaluations directly affect the 
salary increase of the pilots. However, supervisors tend not to observe all the dimensions of 
their pilot’s efforts. While supervisors base evaluations mostly on subjectivity, some as
of work effort, in particular the time pilots spend on extra duties, like for example, the 
 
109 Outside the labour market context, several other papers related behaviour in experiments to behaviour in real-
life situations: Fehr et al. (2003) conducted a survey and included experimental questions to assess which survey 
questions predict the behaviour in the experimental questions. They found that trustworthiness in their gift 
exchange game is not predicted by the claimed trusting behaviour in the past of the individuals. Carter and 
Castillo (2002) researched whether the results of trust games may serve as a predictor for the material well being 
of poor people living in South Africa and found positive results for urban areas but not for the rural ones. 
Bettinger and Slonim (2005) conducted dictator games in schools and researched whether the winning of a 
scholarship changes the behaviour of children and parents but found only results for their behaviour towards 
charitable organisations but not towards fellow students. 
110 This chapter is most closely related to Karlan (2004), who compared laboratory trust games with field data in 
Peru. He found that the more trustworthy people in experiments had a higher probability to pay back their loans 
in a real group lending microfinance program. 
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evaluation of a new system, go largely unnoticed. This means that this particular effort can 
not be motivated by considerations of evaluation or reputation, indicating all the more th
reciprocity might be a relevant factor: Due to the subjective nature of the evaluations, a 
worker might reciprocate the announcement of a positive or negative 
at 
change in his subjective 
ry their 
at 
, who 
ughly 
rtheless sufficient to 
 
he results are discussed in section five. 
Finally, section six is the summary and conclusion. 
4.2. Institutional Background 
n 
hile to give the reader the 
111
. First, 
tional 
                                                
performance evaluation with an effort that does not affect his salary. 
By using a unique dataset that allows me to track such activities, I find that pilots va
effort level on extra duties in response to changes in their performance evaluations. 
Surprisingly good evaluations lead to higher effort levels on these unrewarded tasks. This 
finding alone, however, may not only be attributed to reciprocity. It can also be construed th
pilots with good evaluations are asked to perform these tasks. To attribute the behaviour to 
reciprocity, I examine whether the individual reciprocity measured in the experiment predicts 
responses to changes in the performance evaluations. And indeed, I find that those pilots
demonstrate more strongly positive reciprocity, increase their effort levels more after a 
surprisingly good evaluation, while pilots who are more negatively reciprocal reduce their 
effort levels proportionately more after a worse evaluation. Due to the small sample (ro
60 pilots observed over a four year period), my estimated effects are not very precise. 
However, the variation in behaviour in the laboratory experiment is neve
detect significant differences in responses to good and bad evaluations. 
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows: In section two I provide the institutional 
background of the specific workforce, section three explains the experiment and section four
renders the predictions. The empirical analysis and t
I conducted my experiments (see chapter two) and empirical analysis (see chapter three) in a
environment that has some special features. It is therefore worthw
necessary information to be able to appreciate the later results.  
The workers I am looking at are all Swiss Air Force pilots. Two special features of their 
situation render me the unique possibility to find reciprocity in their real life situation
pilots earn their salary according to a subjective performance evaluation of which its 
subjective characteristics might give rise to considerations of reciprocity. Second, institu
 
111 For a detailed discussion of the environmental background see chapter two and three. 
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arrangements within the Swiss Air Force are such that direct superiors do not have data 
available on an important dimension of an effort, namely how much time the pilots spend on
extra duties
 
 besides their normal flight activities. This renders an opportunity for reciprocal 
e-
pilot in 
 
ctive 
y year 
ed 
 
 
are 
 
mple, 
the amount of hours a pilot actually works.114 And so pleasing a superior becomes very 
                                                
activities. 
Let me begin with the first issue: The pilots earn their salary according to three schemes. The 
first scheme concerns a fixed compensation received in accordance with compensating wag
differentials (Borjas, 2002, 201-225) due to their increased accident probability in military 
aviation (Federal Department of Defence, 2003b:1272, Art.2).112 The second scheme 
concerns the so-called wage bracket. The wage bracket defines the maximum salary a 
a certain managerial position may reach. It hence defines the range of the salary. If a pilot gets
promoted from one wage bracket into another, he gets a once-only salary rise of 5%. The last 
and central scheme defines salary-increase and bonus payments for pilots. It is the subje
performance evaluation system called LOBE. This acronym stands for "Lohnrelevante 
Beurteilung" and translates as "wage-relevant evaluation" (or literally “to praise”). Ever
in November the superior defines individual criteria, upon which the pilot is measur
throughout the following year. Examples for these criteria include “shows a strong 
willingness to fulfil his tasks” or else “uses wisely his freedom of action”. The superior then
judges to what degree the pilot fulfils these criteria. At the end of that year, in October, the
pilot receives the results of this subjective performance evaluation on a scale of 1-5. If he 
receives a result of 1 he does not get any salary raise and may fear layoff. If he receives a 
result of 5, he will get a 6% wage-increment for the next period. If he already reached the 
maximum salary of his wage bracket he can get as much as a 12% bonus payment. There 
however budget constraints on how many pilots get good evaluations. It is defined that a 
maximum of 18% of the workers might get a bonus payment above 4.4% (Swiss Government,
2001:21, Art.49).113 It is important to note that the measurement of the defined criteria is of a 
purely subjective nature, as superiors have no access to the statistical data about, for exa
 
112 This accident probability is not to be confused with the economic risk (see e.g. Bloom and Milkovich, 1998). 
113 A tournament based on this forced distribution is unlikely because the pilots are evaluated upon different 
criteria. 
114 This astonishing fact is caused by the different interests of the people who collected the data about the time 
spent on different tasks by the pilots and the ones responsible for the subjective performance evaluations of the 
pilots. Hence the information I was able to gather has never been passed on to the direct superiors of the pilots 
because it has never been edited in this way. 
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difficult if personal disliking of one another exists.115 For this reason, and because it is wage-
relevant, I use the subjective performance evaluation as a proxy for friendly and unfriendly 
actions by superiors, which might give rise to considerations of reciprocal friendly and 
unfriendly actions by the pilots. 
The second issue now renders the pilot the perfect opportunity to exert reciprocity by acting 
friendly or unfriendly himself: Although the subjective performance evaluation system is 
meant to consider all of the pilot’s tasks,116 gaps do exist: I will show later that the amount of 
extra duties performed by a pilot does not directly influence his subjective performance 
evaluation.117 This means that I not only believe, like Gibbons (1998:121), that complex 
effort is unverifiable, but also show that changes in effort levels on extra duties are 
unobserved by superiors. As this opens a free field for reciprocal activity without detrime
effects on reputation, I gathered this critical data, which was possible because my direct 
superior was Commander of all Swiss Air F
ntal 
orce pilots. 
                                                
The described situation may hold a general relevance: There is in every job some unobserved 
effort level, where normally nobody is able to measure it. According to standard incentive 
theory, workers would avoid doing extra duties if their accomplishment is not wage effective 
(Prendergast, 1999: 21-33). In the particular case of the Air Force, the execution of such 
duties would be difficult due to the lack of volunteers available, since pilots, by nature, like to 
fly much more.118 However, if extra duties, which are in themselves complements to normal 
duties, are not performed properly, the overall performance of the Air Force suffers.119 Hence 
 
115 For these cases the subjectivity of the evaluation is also emphasized by Schettgen (1996:261). For further 
points see also Becker (1999:369) and Becker (1998: 241). 
116 Baker (2000:420) suggested the use of subjective performance evaluations to exactly solve the multitasking 
problems of today’s complex jobs. 
117 With extra duties, I consider all the duties a normal pilot does not do. A non complete list of extra duties 
would contain representative work, the organisation of operations, the work for superiors or other organisations 
as representatives of the Air Force, the publication of new manuals, the re- and evaluation of equipment, work in 
the field of human resources and IT, pre-screening or flight safety activities, missions abroad and other special 
projects. For a complete list see  in the appendix. Table 21
118 This seems reasonable because these pilots underwent a prolonged screening to become a military aviator. 
Thus pilots must be highly motivated to fly, i.e. to primarily exert normal duties. 
119 This information is important because Hennig-Schmidt, Rockenbach and Sadrieh (2005) found in laboratory 
experiments that workers show positive reciprocity if they know about the employer’s surplus. 
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voluntary performance of extra duties may be considered as friendly behaviour of pilots by 
which means they may express their reciprocity.120 
Aside from the possibility to measure reciprocity in their real life situation, I must bear in 
mind that I am not conducting research within an average workforce. Like Lazear, 
Malmendier and Weber (2005:1f) suggested, people self-select into specific labour market 
settings. In my case a prolonged screening by the employer augments the self-selection of 
employees. Only 1-2% of the applicants actually become Swiss Air Force pilots. This reflects 
not only the supply and demand for this job but also the fraction of applicants that is able to 
show the required qualities to become a military pilot. This means the Air Force makes every 
effort to screen applicants correctly. The evaluation consists of many phases, including 
written exams, flying small and large training aircraft and also a computerized test for 
teamwork abilities. This teamwork ability plays a central role in a pilot’s every day life as his 
survival may depend on good teamwork in combat or emergency situations. This enhanced 
ability may influence my empirical findings, as pilots seem to be more positive and less 
negative reciprocal than other people (see chapter two). 
4.3. Measuring Positive and Negative Reciprocity 
To assess positive and negative reciprocity I used in chapter two the “moon lighting game” 
(Abbink, Irlenbusch and Renner, 2000). I explain the course of the game according to its 
visualization in Figure 15.121 In the beginning Player A and B each receive an initial 
endowment of 20 tokens. In the first step of the game Player A has to decide whether to be 
friendly, neutral or unfriendly. If he decides on being friendly he passes 10 tokens to Player 
B, if he is unfriendly he takes five tokens from Player B and if he is neutral, nothing happens. 
To render the friendly action efficient and the unfriendly action inefficient, the experimenter 
doubles the impact on B’s payoff. That means that Player B either gains 20 or 0 tokens, or he 
looses 10 tokens contingent on the friendliness of Player A. The second stage is now of 
central interest to us: Player B has to decide how to react. He may either reward or punish 
Player A. Unlike Player A, he can only spend tokens to do this. Player B might use up to 10 
tokens for this action. If he rewards Player A, the experimenter doubles the tokens again, so 
                                                 
120 This idea is further supported by the fact that every superior is willing to allow a pilot to perform extra instead 
of normal duties. 
121 Figure 15 equals Figure 1. Because each chapter of this work represents a complete independent research 
article, I explain the experimental design of chapter two again. 
  72
 Chapter 4: Reciprocity at Work 
Player A may receive up to 20 tokens. If Player B punishes Player A, the impact is also 
doubled. That means 10 tokens spent by Player B for punishment result in 20 tokens removed 
from Player A by the experimenter. Player B does not however receive these tokens. 
 
Figure 15: Experimental Design: Player A's choices vs. Player B's strategic options. 
 
 
Examples:  - A takes 5, so B looses 10, then B punishes -10, he has to pay 10, so A looses 20. 
 - A gives 10, so B gets 20, then B rewards +10, he has to pay 10, so A wins 20. 
 
The sub game-perfect equilibrium with strictly selfish preferences is the following: Player A 
foresees that Player B maximizes his payoff by not spending any tokens. Hence Player A 
maximizes his own payoff by taking all the possible tokens from Player B. Thus Player A 
ends up with his endowed 20 tokens plus the five he got from Player B. Player B can only 
hold on to the 10 tokens Player A could not take from him. He has no possibility to augment 
his own payoff. If however Player B has no strictly selfish preferences, his reactions may 
serve as a proxy for reciprocity. He might show positive reciprocity if he spends tokens to 
reward friendly actions of Player A and negative reciprocity if he spends tokens to punish 
unfriendly actions of Player A.122 
I gained my experimental data on the occasion of a workshop for all Swiss Air Force pilots 
held in December 2005 (see chapter two). Thanks to the compulsory nature of the workshop, 
participation bias seems unlikely.123 To assess for all pilots their reciprocity parameters, I 
                                                 
122 I do not analyse the actions of player A, as they are not of interest for the further analysis. For more details 
see chapter two. 
123 Only few pilots were unavailable due to important missions that could not be cancelled. 
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paired the pilots with outsiders, namely students as Player A.124 Furthermore I used the 
strategy method to assess positive and negative reciprocity. This means that Player B had to 
make decisions for all possible actions of Player A before he saw the actual decision. This had 
also the advantage that spontaneous emotional responses could be avoided (see e.g. 
Loewenstein, 2005). Like this the situation resembled much more average behaviour in a 
prolonged relationship between employees and employers. 
On the actual day in December 2005, pilots were seated in a big hangar and were told that 
they could earn real money by making decisions. First they received the instructions with 
examples, and then the decision sheets were passed out. Only after the pilots had returned 
these papers, they were issued a closed envelope with the decision of Player A inside. 
Payments were distributed at the end of the day. 
4.4. Propositions 
In this section I am going to make propositions about the predictive power of experimental 
data for the behaviour in real life situations. To be able to do this, I start by predicting the 
behaviour of the pilots in their specific situation. 
According to the above discussion, I regard the subjective performance evaluation as the 
initial friendly or unfriendly action by the superior. To assess the friendliness of this action, I 
make the assumption that a pilot normally expects the same subjective performance 
evaluation as last year. This might not always be true but most likely reflects the average 
expectations of a pilot if he cares for the evaluation and tries to meet the qualifications.125 
Hence he might consider a better subjective performance evaluation than the previous year as 
a friendly action because the superior appreciated his work. If, however, the subjective 
performance evaluation is worse than the previous year, the pilot might consider it as an 
                                                 
124 I actually conducted further treatments. As I did not find any differences in the results to these treatments, I 
used the treatment for which I gained data for all pilots as Player B. 
125 This assumption is further supported by the study of Mas (2006), who showed that police officers final offer 
served them as a reference point for their expected wage. Also Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1986:730) 
claimed: „The current wage of an employee serves as reference for evaluating the fairness of future adjustments 
of that employee's wage." Finally the literature about “psychological contracts” supports the importance of 
expectations (see e.g. Herriot, Manning and Kidd, 1997). 
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unfriendly action.126 If a pilot is reciprocally motivated, he may now reconsider the amount of 
extra duties he performs. A respective increase or decrease not only helps or hurts the 
employer but equally important does not affect the pilot’s next performance evaluation. 
Because I already found in chapter three that pilots spend their time on extra-duties as a 
function of the differences between their last two performance evaluations, I now proceed by 
a further refinement of those results: Following Kube, Maréchal and Puppe (2006) I further 
distinguish between positive and negative reciprocity. I thus propose for the same pilots: 
? Proposition 1a: A pilot increases his time spent on extra duties for one period, if he 
receives a better subjective performance evaluation than in the previous year. 
? Proposition 1b: A pilot decreases his time spent on extra duties for one period, if he 
receives a worse subjective performance evaluation than in the previous year. 
Having prepared the ground, I now turn to the main subject of this chapter: It seems 
reasonable to assume that the proposed real life behaviour is actually based on the same kind 
of individual inclination towards positive and negative reciprocity as I am able to measure in 
experiments. Hence the measured behaviour in the experimental situation should be able to 
predict the behaviour in the real life situation. I consequently propose for the positive and the 
negative case the following: 
? Proposition 2a: Depending on the experimentally measured positive reciprocity, a 
pilot increases his time spent on extra duties for one period, after he received a better 
subjective performance evaluation than before.  
? Proposition 2b: Depending on the experimentally measured negative reciprocity, a 
pilot decreases his time spent on extra duties for one period, after he received a worse 
subjective performance evaluation than before. 
To test these propositions I make use of my two datasets for the same pilots. 
                                                 
126 I will of course take into account that the probability of receiving a better evaluation than an already very 
good evaluation is low. I will discuss its operationalisation in the data section. 
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4.5. Empirical Analysis 
4.5.1 Data 
I start this section with the data gained by the experiments in chapter two.127 I however only 
discuss the data for the pilots I am able to match with the empirical data of chapter three.128 A 
graphical analysis of the measured reactions of the pilots as Player B can be found in Figure 
16. 
 
Figure 16: The pilots’ reactions to different actions of Player A. 
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More detailed results are displayed in Table 20 in the appendix. Under the names posreci and 
negreci it shows the means and standard deviations of the reactions of the pilots to friendly 
and unfriendly actions. I consider these reactions as a direct measure for their positive and 
                                                 
127 A detailed discussion of this data is available in chapter two where I used further experimental results to find 
out whether pilots differ from students and whether pilots treat outsiders differently to insiders. I found that 
pilots are significantly more positive reciprocal than students and that pilots do not care who they are paired 
with. 
128 I was able to match 58 out of 96 pilots. The reduced number of pilots is mainly caused by pilots who 
participated in the experiment in December 2005 but where not employed yet by the Swiss Air Force in the 
period from 2001 until 2004. 
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negative reciprocity. I do not include the results from the neutral setting as they may be biased 
by the expectations of the pilots in the experiment and do not render me any additional 
information. It was however important for Player B to know that Player A had the option to 
be neutral. The results for positive and negative reciprocity show the expected signs. 
Especially the positive reciprocity seems to be rather high on average, a phenomenon that 
may be caused by the pre-screening, training and socialization of the pilots for teamwork 
abilities.129 
The empirical data used here was provided by the Commander of all professional Swiss Air 
Force pilots at the end of 2005.130 Again I am only to discuss the data I am able to match to 
the experimental data of chapter two.131 The data consist of individual time recordings of the 
pilots for two evaluation periods. They start as of November 2002 and end by October 2004. 
Each pilot had to declare the amount of hours he spent on different tasks in a daily column of 
a personal monthly excel sheet, and had to submit his file at the end of every month to 
headquarters, which sometimes used it for the statistical evaluation of the different tasks. This 
means that the entered data had no consequences for the pilot himself, a fact that should 
minimize a self-declaration bias.132 I combine this data with the personal results of the 
subjective performance evaluations of October 2001, October 2002, October 2003 and 
October 2004. This procedure renders me the possibility to test my propositions and 
furthermore allows me to check whether the accomplishment of extra duties does not indeed 
affect the later performance evaluation. To be able to do this, I had to bring the many excel-
files into a format I could analyse. Therefore I first imported the data into statistical software, 
then generated missing values for impossible entries133 and finally adapted daily to hourly 
                                                 
129 Furthermore it seems possible that their daily work environment influences their preferences. Henrich et al. 
(2001) found that especially people with a high payoff from cooperation in their everyday life are very 
cooperative. For a further discussion and the comparison of the pilots with students see chapter two. 
130 For a detailed description of the data see also chapter three. 
131 This restriction does not seem critical, as it was strictly coincidental whether a pilot was able to attend the 
compulsory workshop where the experimental data were gained. 
132 The only problem I had to cope with was incomplete datasets. If a pilot declared in less than 75% of the 
available standard working time per month the nature of his activities (including days off and sick leave), I 
treated it as a missing value. To test whether this affected the later results, I run the regressions of  
without this restriction. The results were almost not affected.  
Table 13
133 I treated daily working hours of less than 0 or more than 24 as impossible. Furthermore I deleted those pilots, 
who always filled out their excel sheets formally with a daily 8.5 hours.  
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data by, for example, substituting 8.5 hours off-time for a day off.134 I then generated an 
individual yearly average for monthly working hours on each task. Next, I combined all 
normal pilots’ tasks into one single variable called normal duty and all extra tasks into another 
single variable called extra duty. The original tasks are listed in Table 21 in the appendix. I 
finally ended up with one single observation per year per person for extra duties. The 
respective descriptive statistics are displayed in Table 20 in the appendix. 
I then combined these observations with the subjective performance evaluation received at the 
end of the period. In this case I called the variable for the subjective performance evaluation 
LOBE, as this is the internal name for the system. I also combined the topical data with the 
difference of the last two subjective performance evaluations and called it LOBElagdelta. For 
the period of 2004, for instance, I subtracted the LOBE-evaluation of the period 2002 from 
the LOBE-evaluation of the period 2003. Specified descriptions of these and all further 
variables are available in Table 12. 
 
Table 12: Descriptions of the variables sorted by the respective evaluation period. 
Period Variable Name Description
Evaluation Extra Duty The average of monthly extra hours worked between November 2002 and October 2003
Year 03 LOBE The LOBE-evaluation received by October 2003 (=LOBE03)
(Nov 02 LOBElag The LOBE-evaluation received by October 2002 (=LOBE02)
 - Okt 03) LOBElagdelta The Difference between the LOBE-evaluation received by October 2002 and October 2001 
(=LOBE02-LOBE01)
posLOBElagdelta The positive side of LOBElagdelta [=(LOBElagdelta if LOBElagdelta>=0, 0 if 
LOBElagdelta<0)* its inverse probability of appearance]
negLOBElagdelta The negative side of LOBElagdelta [=(LOBElagdelta if LOBElagdelta<=0, 0 if 
LOBElagdelta>0)* its inverse probability of appearance]
posreci The reactions of the pilots to a friendly behaviour of players A in the laboratory experiment
negreci The reactions of the pilots to a unfriendly behaviour of players A in the laboratory experiment
posreci*posLOBElagdelta The interaction of posreci with posLOBElagdelta
negreci*negLOBElagdelta The interaction of negreci with negLOBElagdelta
Evaluation Extra Duty The average of monthly extra hours worked between November 2003 and October 2004
Year 04 LOBE The LOBE-evaluation received by October 2004 (=LOBE04)
(Nov 03 LOBElag The LOBE-evaluation received by October 2003 (=LOBE03)
 - Okt 04) LOBElagdelta The Difference between the LOBE-evaluation received by October 2003 and October 2002 
(=LOBE03-LOBE02)
posLOBElagdelta The positive side of LOBElagdelta [=(LOBElagdelta if LOBElagdelta>=0, 0 if 
LOBElagdelta<0)* its inverse probability of appearance]
negLOBElagdelta The negative side of LOBElagdelta [=(LOBElagdelta if LOBElagdelta<=0, 0 if 
LOBElagdelta>0)* its inverse probability of appearance]
posreci The reactions of the pilots to a friendly behaviour of players A in the laboratory experiment
negreci The reactions of the pilots to a unfriendly behaviour of players A in the laboratory experiment
posreci*posLOBElagdelta The interaction of posreci with posLOBElagdelta
negreci*negLOBElagdelta The interaction of negreci with negLOBElagdelta
Delta Extra Duty The Difference between the time spent on EXTRA duties in Nov 03-Oct 04 and in Nov 04 - 
Oct 03.(=Extra04-Extra03)
Notes:
Source: own describtions based on data provided by the Swiss Air Force.  
                                                 
134 I also used the individual average of daily working hours but found no differences in the following results. 
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I further generated a variable that only captures positive differences in the last two subjective 
performance evaluations and called it posLOBElagdelta. I did the same for the negative case 
and generated negLOBElagdelta. These last two variables take on the value of zero if the 
other one is positive, and positive values otherwise. I will use these variables to assess 
whether a friendly or an unfriendly action has been taken. As it becomes more and more 
difficult for a superior to issue a better evaluation if the prior evaluation is already good, I 
applied to the positive and negative differences of the last two evaluations a probability 
distribution. In this vein I tried to additionally value the friendliness of the action. I estimated 
the probability of receiving a better evaluation by using the forced distribution applied by the 
Swiss Government (Swiss Government, 2001:21, Art.49). This means that I multiplied the 
positive difference of the last two evaluations with the inverse probability of it to be positive 
at all. This results in a higher value of an increase of a good subjective performance 
evaluation than of an increase of a bad subjective performance evaluation. Consequently the 
more unlikely event is of higher value. For negative differences of the last two evaluations I 
did the opposite, which results in a worse unfriendly action if an already bad subjective 
performance evaluation is decreased than if a good subjective performance evaluation is 
decreased. 
Combining the experimental and the empirical data, I end up with 116 datasets for 58 
pilots.135 
4.5.2 Procedure and Results 
Before I can turn to test the propositions I have to assess whether the results of chapter three 
are still valid for the restricted dataset. I start by analysing whether the amount of extra duties 
exerted is actually an unobserved effort level. To verify this assumption I run a standard OLS-
regression and a fixed effects regression.136 The results remain unchanged to the ones in 
chapter three: According to a fixed effects regression I do not find any positive effect of the 
                                                 
135 As I am going to use fixed effects regression techniques it is critical that my data bears inter-temporal 
differences. This should be the case as later shown in . Out of the 58 pilots only 12 show zero 
differences in LOBElagdelta between 2004 and 2003 and there are no pilots that performed in 2003 and 2004 the 
same amount of extra duties. 
Figure 17
136 I use the evaluation at the end of a year as the dependent variable, while the average amount of extra and 
normal duties accomplished during the year are the explanatory variables. Additionally I use a dummy-variable 
for the second evaluation period (Nov03-Oct04) to allow for yearly changes in the environment. According to 
 in the appendix the LOBE-evaluations do not comprise any corner-solutions, which makes it 
unnecessary to treat this potential problem. 
Table 20
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performed extra duties in the subjective performance evaluation, while in the OLS-regressions 
the effect is still positive.137 I hence derive that there are some pilots who perform many extra 
duties and at the same time receive good evaluations. They, however, do not receive better 
evaluations if they perform even more extra duties in one year than in another.138 Indeed, 
according to the fixed effects estimation I cannot reject the hypothesis that the amount of 
extra duties accomplished does not influence the later subjective performance evaluation. 
Hence changes in the quantity of extra duties may be considered as unobserved changes in 
effort levels. 
I now turn to the confirmation of the main result of chapter three, where I found extra duties 
to depend on the difference of the last two subjective performance evaluations. This means 
that a pilot performs more extra duties if he is positively surprised and less if he feels 
disappointed. I thus estimate again with the restricted dataset the effect of the difference of the 
last two evaluations (LOBElagdelta) on the hours a pilot works on average for extra duties per 
month. I use, for example, the evaluations of October 2002 and October 2003 to assess 
whether an increase in the evaluation had an effect on the amount of extra duties performed 
between November 2003 and October 2004. To correct for increased extra duties due to 
promotions into management positions I include the wage bracket of the pilots as a control 
variable. Additionally I include a dummy variable for the second period to allow for different 
external conditions (Nov03-Oct04). I start by using the OLS regression, which showed 
statistically significant results in chapter three at the 10% level.  
According to the new results in the first column of Table 13, I observe that the effect of the 
difference of the last two evaluations on extra duties is positive but not significant anymore. 
This result may cast doubts on the viability of the data. Two empirical reasons can however 
be relevant: First, the reduction in the sample size from 192 to 116 observations may have 
caused the standard error to grow from 5.981 to 9.058.139 Second, the regression of the now 
smaller sample could be biased: The OLS-regression only measures whether the pilots who 
received high increases in their evaluations perform more extra duties than those who did not. 
But I already know that some pilots receive good evaluations and at the same time perform 
                                                 
137 Because I am using a smaller sample than in chapter three, it is not surprising that I still do not find any effect 
in the fixed effects regression. 
138 To further test this issue I rerun the same OLS regression with only those observations that had different 
LOBE-values for the years 2003 and 2004. The result remains almost the same. Even the significance of the 
estimator for extra-duty in the OLS regression only climbs by a mere 0.2%. 
139 The point estimate only changed from 10.817 to 9.017. 
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many extra duties (but not because of the increased evaluation). If in the smaller sample these 
pilots receive by coincidence less increases in their evaluations than the pilots who do not 
many extra duties, the result for the OLS regression would show the following: Pilots that did 
not do many extra duties but received high increases in their evaluations, therefore perform 
more extra duties than before, still perform less extra duties than the “average” pilot that did 
not receive a better evaluation.  
 
Table 13: Regression of the effect of positive and negative differences of the last two LOBE-results on the 
 amount of extra duties worked, without and with interacted reciprocity. 
Extra duty OLS Fixed Effects OLS Fixed Effects OLS Fixed Effects
monthly hours
LOBElagdelta 9.017  16.916  
(9.058) (12.529)
posreci 0.659  
(0.908)
posLOBElagdelta -20.177  75.374 * -92.931  -175.518  
(31.558) (42.377) (118.732) (107.388)
posreci*posLOBElagdelta 7.722  27.433 **
(12.601) (12.267)
negreci 0.784  
(0.495)
negLOBElagdelta -87.843 ** 19.036  -95.262 *** 19.366  
(34.823) (52.461) (31.157) (37.740)
negreci*negLOBElagdelta -7.494 ** -8.105 **
(3.335) (3.668)
Wage bracket 11.963 *** 1.097  11.720 *** -0.118  11.799 *** -0.501  
(2.413) (2.045) (2.224) (2.644) (2.114) (2.922)
Nov03-Oct04 0.782  6.256  -0.243  8.577 * 0.115  10.370 **
(3.620) (5.057) (3.653) (4.844) (3.908) (5.086)
const -244.515 *** 19.108  -234.501 *** 42.664  -243.312 *** 51.649  
(59.042) (48.904) (55.070) (62.747) (53.104) (69.898)
adj. R2 0.3513 0.7177 0.3772 0.7273 0.4052 0.7498
n 116 116 116 116 116 116
clusters 58 58 58 58 58 58
F-Test for 
posreci*posLOBElagdelta 3.97
negreci*negLOBElagdelta 0.0249
Notes:
Dependent variable: yearly mean of monthly extra hours
Coefficient of Fixed-Effects regressions
(Robust standard errors in OLS and FE-regressions adjusted for clustering on individuals in parentheses).
Level of sign.: ***:p<=0.01,**: 0.01<p<=0.05, *:p<=0.10
Source: own calculations based on Swiss Air Force data.  
 
To rule out this possible bias I proceed by using an individual fixed effects regression and 
adjust the standard errors for clustering on individuals.140 Like this I am able to assess, 
whether changes in the evaluations cause changes in individual behaviour. The results in the 
second column of Table 13 are this time closer to the ones in chapter three, where I found a 
                                                 
140 With the use of adjusted standard errors, I prevent them to be to small for the case that the error-term is 
correlated within the observations of an individual pilot. 
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point estimate of 14.004 with an adjusted standard error for clustering on individuals of 
7.937.141 This time the point estimate is 16.916 and the adjusted standard error climbs 
to 12.529, which could be caused again by the shrunken sample size. Nevertheless, the effect 
of the difference of the last two evaluations on extra duties remains statistically significant 
according to a one-sided test on the 10% level. A respective graphical analysis is displayed in 
Figure 17. 
 
Figure 17: Pilots’ individual reactions to changes in their subjective performance evaluations. 
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On the x-axis the fixed-effects nature is captured by the difference in the differences between 
the last two evaluations. On the y-axis the differences between the amount of performed extra 
duties in the evaluation periods of 2004 and 2003 are displayed. The fitted values present a 
positive dependence of the two axes. The figure thus shows that the empirical findings do not 
seem to be based on coincidence. I prefer to avoid making conclusions about the bias in the 
OLS-estimation until later, at the conclusion of this section. Yet I infer that my main result of 
chapter three is to a reasonable extent confirmed. 
                                                 
141 It is important to note that I report the full r-squared for the case of the fixed effects regression and not only 
the “within”-value. The respective high value is hence also explained by the explanatory power of the fixed 
effects themselves. 
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I thus proceed by empirically testing my first propositions and divide my findings of chapter 
three into two parts: In an OLS and fixed effects regression I replace the variable for the 
difference between the last two subjective performance evaluations by it’s positive and 
negative part, namely by positive differences in evaluations (posLOBElagdelta) and negative 
differences in evaluations (negLOBElagdelta). The results of the respective estimations are 
displayed in the third and forth columns of Table 13. It is surprising to see that on the one 
hand in the OLS regression I find a statistically significant effect of negative differences on 
the amount of extra duties performed, while the positive differences are not at all statistically 
significant and even have an unexpected sign; and on the other, in the fixed effects regression, 
I only find effects for positive differences of the last two evaluations, while in this case 
negative differences are not statistically significant and bear the wrong sign. That means that 
the positive result of the OLS regression in the first column of Table 13 was mainly driven by 
negative differences in evaluations, while the result of the fixed effects regression in the 
second column of Table 13 was mainly driven by positive differences in evaluations. This 
could only indicate that the OLS-regression is biased despite the fact it would confirm 
proposition 1b.142 Because already the OLS-coefficient for the effect of extra duties on the 
later subjective performance evaluations seems to be biased, I focus on the fixed effects 
regression of column four of Table 13: According to this analysis the positive difference 
between the last two subjective performance evaluations bears a positive effect on the amount 
of extra duties performed on a statistical significance level of 10%. 
                                                 
142 The following situation could induce this bias: As previously seen, the pilots, who on average perform more 
extra duties, receive also on average better evaluations (but due to a different reason). If the changes in the 
evaluations appear primarily for lower evaluations, the following situations materializes: According to the fixed 
effects regression in the forth column of Ta , increased evaluations lead to increased amounts of performed 
extra duties while decreased evaluations have no effects. Hence, the pilots, who did not perform many extra 
duties, but received a better evaluation, now perform a bit more extra duties, but probably still less than the 
pilots, who started by doing many extra duties but did not receive a changed evaluation. That means that for this 
example, the pilots who received better evaluations than before perform still less extra duties than the average 
pilot who did not receive a better evaluation. These coherences might lead to the negative estimator for positive 
changes of evaluations in the OLS-regression in column three of . If also only pilots who originally 
perform few extra duties and receive bad evaluations received negative changes in their evaluation, an equal bias 
of the OLS-estimation prevails: Even though these pilots may not have changed the amount of extra duties they 
perform, the pilots who received a worse evaluations now perform on average less extra duties than the average 
pilot who did received the same evaluation than before. 
ble 13
Table 13
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Hence I cannot reject the hypothesis that a positive difference in the last two subjective 
performance evaluations augments the average time spent for extra duties. Thus proposition 
1a is supported. 
? Result 1a: A pilot increases his time spent on extra duties for one period, if he 
receives a better subjective performance evaluation than the year before. 
For the case that the pilot receives a worse evaluation than the year before, I find however no 
effects. The estimator in the forth column of Table 13 is not only statistically insignificant but 
even bears the wrong sign. Hence I must reject the hypothesis that a negative difference in the 
last two subjective performance evaluations has a negative impact on the time spent for extra 
duties. 
? Result 2b: A pilot does not decrease his time spent on extra duties, if he receives a 
worse subjective performance evaluation than last year. 
This finding is in my view very astonishing. Charness and Rabin (2002) showed that 
especially negative reciprocity is a strong behavioural force and Mas (2006) found very 
strong signs of negative reciprocity after police officers had lost final offer arbitration. Also 
Kube, Maréchal and Puppe (2006:7) report findings of very strong negative reciprocity in 
their field experiment. I, however, find only positive reciprocity according to my fixed effects 
regressions. If I would not have had any experimental data, I would probably even call theses 
findings questionable or attribute them to the fact that the pilots did not actually experience 
wage cuts but only smaller wage increments as expected. It seems possible, though, that the 
results may be triggered by something else: May be the very strong positive and weak 
negative average reciprocity of the screened pilots (also see Figure 16 on page 76) influenced 
the empirical outcome.143 To test this idea I turn to propositions 2a and 2b. 
I proceed by integrating into the regression analysis the results of my experiment. That means 
that I additionally use two interaction terms: The first term concerns the reaction to friendly 
actions: In addition to the simple variable for positive differences between the last two 
subjective performance evaluations, I interact the same variable with the measured positive 
reciprocity in the experiment (posreci*posLOBElagdelta). If proposition 2a is true, the 
interaction term should become significant while the sole term for the positive difference of 
the evaluations (posLOBElagdelta) should become statistically insignificant. To test at the 
                                                 
143 I also showed in chapter two that pilots are far more positive reciprocal than students. 
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same time proposition 2b I integrate the interaction of negative reciprocity with the negative 
differences in the last two subjective performance evaluations (negreci*negLOBElagdelta). 
To show the full property of my data I start again by an OLS-regression and include the 
individual values for positive and negative reciprocity. I find the following: According to the 
fifth column of Table 13, the interaction-terms for the positive and negative reciprocity in the 
experiment with the real life situation bear the correct signs. However, only the negative term 
is statistically significant at the 5% level, while I find no significant results for positive 
reciprocity. Even though these findings are tentative in the light of found negative reciprocity 
in former studies, it includes one puzzling result: The estimator for the reaction to negative 
changes in evaluations remains statistically significant and negative like in the regression 
without the interactions in column three. This casts some doubts on either the validity of my 
propositions or the applicability of the empirical method.144 As I most probably experience 
the same bias in the OLS-regression as before, I proceed again by fixed effects regression 
techniques. 
Hence I turn now to the results of the regression in the last column of Table 13, in which I 
believe more strongly. In these results, the interaction term for positive reciprocity with the 
positive differences between the last two subjective performance evaluations is positive and 
statistically significant at the 5% level. Furthermore the sole positive difference between the 
last two evaluations is not statistically significant anymore and even becomes negative. Hence 
I cannot reject that the measured positive reciprocity is able to predict the degree to which a 
pilot shows positive reciprocity. Furthermore I cannot reject that pilots who do not show any 
positive reciprocity in the experiment do not show any positive reciprocity in my empirical 
data neither. 
? Result 2a: The time a pilot spends on extra duties is a direct function of the 
interaction of the positive difference of the last two subjective performance 
evaluations with his measured positive reciprocity. 
                                                 
144 I wondered whether it might be the strong effect of the wage brackets that biases my regressions. Even 
though it seems probable that a squadron commander does according to the estimation in column five 11 hours 
more extra duties than a normal pilot per month as he has to perform for example the planning of his personnel, 
this effect could bias my regressions. I therefore performed another regression with fixed effects on wage 
brackets that however did not provide any new insights. Only seven of my pilots changed wage brackets and all 
results remain almost the same. Only the estimator for the negative changes in evaluations as well as the 
estimator for the respective interaction term becomes slightly less significant. 
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As opposed to my last fixed effects regression, this time also negative reciprocity prevails: 
According to the last column in Table 13, I find that negative reciprocity is relevant. The 
interaction term of negative reciprocity with the negative difference in the last two subjective 
performance assessments is statistically significant at the 5% level. The sole term for negative 
differences is however not statistically significant as in result 1b. Hence I cannot reject the 
thesis that the measured negative reciprocity is able to predict the degree to which a pilot 
shows negative reciprocity. Furthermore I cannot reject the thesis that pilots who do not show 
any negative reciprocity in the experiment do not show any negative reciprocity in my 
empirical data neither.  
? Result 2b: The time a pilot spends on extra duties is an inverse function of the 
interaction of the negative difference of the last two subjective performance 
evaluations with his measured negative reciprocity. 
This result may explain result 1b as well. As only few pilots are strongly negative reciprocal, 
they were not able to trigger the result in the forth column of Table 13.  
Because of the importance of the results 2a and 2b I further used an F-test for the two 
interaction-terms to find out if they are indeed of any importance for the regression. I found 
an F-value of 3.97. I hence cannot reject my combined hypothesis of propositions 2a and 2b 
at a statistical significance level of 2.5%. 
My second test concerns the affiliation of the original tasks to normal and extra duties. As it 
may be argued that the only reason for my findings is a smart sorting of the tasks in Table 21 
(see appendix) into normal and extra duties I did the following: I changed the affiliation of the 
first task by deleting it from his original category and adding it to the other category. Then I 
rerun the last regression of Table 13. 
Thereafter, I reassigned it to its original category and repeated the procedure for the next task. 
Each time, a significance level of one of the two important estimators drops below 10% in the 
new regression, I report the specific task in Table 14 together with the new results for the two 
interaction terms. I find different significance levels for twelve of all tasks if I change their 
affiliation to the opposite duty. Looking at the descriptions of the tasks reported in Table 14 it 
seems clear that they have been well assorted. Therefore the results of this chapter appear to 
be based on correct affiliations of the tasks. 
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Table 14: The twelve critical tasks for the analysis. 
param. se Description
Regression results posreci x posLOBElag 27.433 ** (12.267) original regression
(6. column Table 3) negreci x negLOBElag -8.105 ** (3.668)
removed from normal duties
added to extra duties param. se Description
auslandkam~v posreci x posLOBElag 28.118 *** (10.386) training missions 
negreci x negLOBElag -6.751 (4.584) abroad for jets
nightwayni~h posreci x posLOBElag 26.928 ** (12.186) specific training mission
negreci x negLOBElag -6.404 (3.900) abroad for jets
nomadflieg~h posreci x posLOBElag 27.944 ** (12.539) specific training mission
negreci x negLOBElag -6.478 (3.989) abroad for jets
Flightinstructor posreci x posLOBElag 24.904  (19.256) flight instructor
(v46) negreci x negLOBElag -8.325 ** (3.866)
weitereaus~v posreci x posLOBElag 24.413  (16.544) other training missions
negreci x negLOBElag -8.585 ** (3.655) abroad for jets
ukfa18 posreci x posLOBElag 21.110  (12.630) flight training
negreci x negLOBElag -8.951 ** (4.126) on F/A 18
flugdienst~g posreci x posLOBElag 33.163  (26.619) individual 
negreci x negLOBElag -9.764 ** (4.381) flight training
orgplanung~b posreci x posLOBElag 25.470  (15.810) organisation and planing
negreci x negLOBElag -8.174 * (4.256) of individual flights
flugdienstit posreci x posLOBElag 26.470 * (15.018) individual 
negreci x negLOBElag -3.109 (6.926) flight training 
spukspugin~n posreci x posLOBElag 25.576 * (13.195) flight instructor
negreci x negLOBElag -0.478 (6.076) for adv. Helic. training
truppendie~d posreci x posLOBElag 29.523 * (17.346) flight training
negreci x negLOBElag -4.215 (6.001) with national reserve
removed from extra duties
added to normal duties param. se Description
fhrungorga~n posreci x posLOBElag 28.762 ** (13.686) management and
negreci x negLOBElag -6.488 (4.505) organisation
Notes:
Critical Coefficient for Subjective Performance Evaluation (LOBE) of Fixed-Effects regression 
after changing the category of every single variable.
Dependent variable: yearly mean of monthly extra hours
(Robust standard errors adj. for clustering in parantheses).
Level of sign.: ***:p<=0.01,**: 0.01<p<=0.05, *:p<=0.10
Source: own calculations based on Swiss Air Force data.  
 
4.6. Conclusions 
It is still widely discussed whether reciprocal behaviour plays a role in actual labour market 
situations. Even though many theoretical and experimental studies have addressed this issue, 
studies using real labour market data are still scarce and their relevance uncertain. To fill this 
gap I researched within a real firm whether the subjective characteristic of subjective 
performance evaluations give rise to reciprocal behaviour. Furthermore, I researched whether 
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I might be able to predict the outcomes with laboratory experiments. Hence I not only sought 
for a real labour market situation where reciprocity might play a role but also wanted to 
confirm its validity by experimental data. 
I base my research on the two previous chapters: In chapter three I found that the pilots of the 
Swiss Air Force show reciprocal behaviour as a function of their subjective performance 
evaluations. I discovered the reciprocal reaction in an effort level that was clearly unobserved 
by a direct superior, while I had the rare opportunity to measure it. This is of central interest 
because I strongly assume that in every job such unobserved effort levels exist, though 
normally nobody is able to measure them. I found that the level of this specific effort 
provided by a pilot directly depends on the difference between his last two subjective 
performance evaluations. In chapter two I furthermore researched the individual parameters 
for reciprocity of the same pilots by experiments and found that they are far more positively 
reciprocal than their student counterparts. 
My main findings are the following: The individual experimental results for positive 
reciprocity are good predictors for individual reactions to exceeded salary expectations, while 
individual experimental results for negative reciprocity are good predictors for individual 
reactions to respective disappointments. This means that the more a worker shows reciprocity 
in the experiment, the more he shows reciprocity in the labour market situation. I conclude 
that I indeed found reciprocity in a real labour market. 
I furthermore derive that it proved crucial to combine the experimental and the empirical data 
as each single dataset was not enough to draw a clear picture: The sole empirical data for the 
effects of “friendly” and “unfriendly” actions only showed that pilots exert more extra duties 
if their expectations about their subjective performance evaluations are exceeded, while the 
reactions to disappointments remained undetected. Looking at this preliminary empirical 
analysis, one could have interpreted that only a positive deviation to the former subjective 
performance evaluation is relevant.145  
Even with the respective knowledge of the experimental results of chapter two it would not 
have been clear whether these findings were able to predict any real behaviour in workers. 
The pilots could have seen the experiment despite its financial consequences as a simple game 
                                                 
145 General knowledge gained by experiments with students would have raised questions. Even controlling for 
social background variables as suggested by Fehr et al. (2003), Gachter, Herrmann and Thoni (2004), Bellmare 
and Kroeger (2005) and Gueth, Schmidt and Sutter (2007), would not have revealed that Swiss Air Force pilots 
are that much more positive and almost not at all negative in their reciprocal behaviour. 
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with no real relevance. Exclusively the one-to-one combination of the two different datasets 
revealed the complete picture: A pilot truly has to be positively or negatively reciprocal to be 
affected by a change in his subjective performance evaluation. And also any deterioration of 
the subjective performance evaluation may be relevant. If a pilot is negatively reciprocal he 
will retaliate against the worse evaluation by providing a lower unobserved effort level in the 
next period. Hence the combination of both the experimental with the real life data showed 
that real life data does not always tell a complete story. With real life data on the one hand 
one cannot capture more than an average behaviour of a specific group of individuals. With 
experimental results on the other, one might not be sure whether to be able to predict if a 
specific real life behaviour exists. 
The combination of the data provided me with three insights: Firstly, reciprocity actually 
matters in real labour market situations. Even if a subjective performance evaluation is 
applied to forgo the incomplete view of direct incentive systems, employers will never be able 
to evade dysfunctional behavioural responses of their employees altogether. The negative 
reciprocal effects of disappointments seem to be of a central issue. Secondly, I might add that 
it seems more than ever important to screen, train and socialize a workforce intensively for 
occupations where trustworthiness and reciprocity plays an important role. Hence I emphasize 
as my third and final point that especially for these jobs, the internal labour market is of 
utmost importance. If a firm is actually able to screen, socialize and train its workers 
correctly, it cannot afford to loose them anymore. 
 
CHAPTER 5:  
 
 
Final Remarks 
With this work I wanted to study whether reciprocal preferences found in experiments are 
important for real internal labour market relations. And indeed, by combining experimental, 
operational and personnel data, I not only find that reciprocity matters but also that reciprocal 
real life behaviour is predictable by experiments. 
Evidence from my experiments with Swiss Air Force pilots shows that reciprocity may be 
relevant for the recruiting decisions of employers. I find that pilots are significantly more 
positively reciprocal and slightly less negatively reciprocal than when compared with students 
and the general population. Further results even show that pilots treat superiors and even 
outsiders just as they treat their fellow cockpit-companions. Of course, this behaviour could 
be based on pure self-selection into this special profession. However, I propose that the Air 
Force screens, trains and socializes its pilots to enable an optimal collaboration between them 
because in this environment team-responsibilities are high and supervision is difficult. 
I furthermore find that reciprocal preferences also play a role for the relationship between 
employees and employers. My empirical analysis of real personnel and operational data 
shows that changes in subjective performance evaluations are reciprocated by higher or lower 
unobserved effort levels. As the provision of unobserved effort can not be explained by 
strictly selfish preferences, considerations of reciprocity remain a possible explanation. 
Interestingly, it is not the absolute values of subjective performance evaluations that seem to 
matter, but instead, it is the relative values of these evaluations in relation to those of the 
previous year that matter most. It thus seems as if expectations adapt quickly. I conclude that 
reciprocity is important for the employer-employee relationship and influences effort levels 
and performance especially in the short-run. 
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Finally, I find that the reciprocity measures of my experimental and empirical analysis 
correlate! The employees that show a stronger reciprocal behaviour in the experiments also 
show a stronger reciprocal behaviour after changes in their subjective performance 
evaluations in the real world. To my knowledge this is a unique finding born out of the 
combination of experimental and empirical data of the same employees. This not only 
enhances the validity of experiments. It also shows that the empirically found real life 
behaviour may indeed be explained by reciprocal preferences, which emphasizes that 
reciprocity is in fact relevant for real workplace relations. Moreover I show that the strong 
positive reciprocity of the pilots may not only help improve their teamwork abilities but may 
also improve the employer-employee relationship. With this work I consequently show that 
reciprocity matters even if on many occasions we are unable to directly observe its effects. 
Possible implications of these findings are the following: I believe it is good practice to apply 
prolonged screening and training for teamwork abilities to employees. Many employers could 
profit from workers who incorporate strong positive reciprocal preferences. This may not only 
be applicable to environments where failures to achieve agreements in teams may have 
detrimental consequences. Also other firms could, with boosted positive reciprocity, reduce 
the necessary supervision of employees. This may even be of more general relevance. 
I believe many firms depend to some extent on the performance of unobserved efforts. As this 
kind of effort seems to be affected by the reciprocity of employees, it is important to know 
what triggers reciprocal behaviour. Looking at my empirical results, it seems as if primarily 
relative changes in working conditions matter, because employees seem to adapt quickly to 
changed conditions such as better salaries. This implies that wage effective subjective 
performance evaluation systems do not induce lasting reciprocal behaviour. All the more, if 
the subjective evaluations have to follow a forced distribution, only few employees may earn 
above average salaries. Superiors may even be forced to evaluate other employees as below 
average. If numerous employees were to trust in the accuracy of the evaluations and at first 
provide higher effort levels to receive better evaluations, many may suffer disappointment.146 
Even if the triggered negative reciprocal behaviour fades out quickly, this experience may 
                                                 
146 Also Becker (1998: 344f) emphasizes that a standard distribution applied to the results of a subjective 
performance evaluation may be harmful due to the small number of workers in a group, the non-random 
selection into this group and the forced below average evaluations for half of the employees. Furthermore 
Kappel and Uschatz (1992: 38) emphasized that it is important that the expectations of the employees are 
answered. 
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undermine the incentive characteristics of the system itself.147 If ultimately no clear 
performance measures are available, an employer may save money and avoid frustration if he 
disconnects salary from such performance evaluations.148 If not, he will have to allow the 
average evaluation to rise slowly. After some years, however, many of his employees will 
reach the top evaluation. If he can not promote them into new positions, where the evaluation 
is adapted to stronger criteria, he will have to replace the whole evaluation system by a 
slightly different one every few years.149 Only by this measure he can start the motivating rise 
of evaluations again.  
 
Further research could investigate carefully the overall effectiveness and cost efficiency of 
subjective performance evaluations and bonus systems. As well, it could try to separate the 
influence of self selection, screening, training and socialization on the reciprocal preferences 
of employees. Experiments may be used for predictions. But special care has to be taken to 
most closely represent the special subgroup of the population and the specific work 
environment of a specific firm. Better yet, future research should use again the combination of 
experimental and empirical data. 
 
 
 
147 Brudney and Condrey (1993:141) conducted a survey of a similar qualitative performance system and found 
that significant factors among others for the system to be effective are its accuracy and fairness. 
148 If instead he introduces a performance evaluation according to measurable tasks, the new evaluation may give 
raise to inefficiently focused efforts of employees. 
149 According to anecdotic evidence this seems to be a common procedure. 
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Appendix 
 
Table 15: B’s absolute spendings conditional different actions of A 
 (Comparison of S-S and P-P treatments) 
  
B’s absolute 
spending cond.  
negative action 
of A 
 
B’s absolute 
spending cond. 
neutral action of 
A 
 
B’s absolute 
spending cond. 
positive action 
of A 
pilot -0.049   
(1.561) 
0.084   
(1.500) 
4.051###   
(1.053)*** 
male 2.560   
(1.373) 
0.674 
(1.166) 
2.550  
(1.294)* 
age -0.366   
(0.357) 
0.182 
(0.345) 
-0.596    
(0.261)** 
age2 0.005   
(0.005) 
-0.003 
(0.005) 
0.007   
(0.003)** 
educ -.062   
(0.381) 
0.213 
(0.387) 
0.168   
(0.150) 
const. 9.654   
(7.407) 
-3.519 
(7.371) 
12.561   
(4.303)*** 
R2 0.059 0.020 0.320 
Prob > F 0.307 0.907 0.0000 
n 88 88 88 
Notes: Dependent variable: absolute amount spent by B after 
different actions of A. Coefficients of OLS-regression (Robust 
standard errors in parentheses). 
Level of significance: *0.1<p, **0.01<p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
corrected levels for multiple hypothesis (Holm, 1979): 
 #0.1<p, ##0.01<p<0.05, ###p<0.01 
Source: own calculations based on experimental evidence from 
December 2005. 
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Table 16: Actions and beliefs in treatment S-S 
Student-Student  A B 
participants 34 34 
missing actions - - 
antireciprocical actions - 1 
used actions 34 33 
missing beliefs 2 1 
beliefs adding up to more than 100% - 4 
used beliefs 32 28 
Source: own calculations based on experimental evidence from 12/05. 
Table 17: Actions and beliefs in treatment S-P 
Student-Pilot A B 
participants 58 116 
missing actions - - 
antireciprocical actions - 4 
used actions 58 112 
missing beliefs 1 3 
beliefs adding up to more than 100% 2 13 
used beliefs 55 96 
Source: own calculations based on experimental evidence from 12/05. 
Table 18: Actions and beliefs in treatment H-L 
H-L A B 
participants 49 67 
missing actions - - 
antireciprocical actions - 1 
used actions 49 66 
missing beliefs - - 
beliefs adding up to more than 100% 2 7 
used beliefs 47 59 
Source: own calculations based on experimental evidence from 12/05. 
Table 19: Actions and beliefs in treatment P-P 
Pilot-Pilot A(H+L) B(H+L) 
participants 25+34 24+33 
missing actions 1+2 1+0 
antireciprocical actions - 0+1 
used actions 24+32 23+32 
missing beliefs - - 
beliefs adding up to more than 100% 1+1 3+3 
used beliefs 23+31 20+29 
Source: own calculations based on experimental evidence from 12/05. 
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Table 20: Descriptive Statistics. 
Variable Year Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Description
Extra Duty 03 58 43.971 30.433 0.000 113.833 The average of monthly 
04 58 52.368 31.679 6.000 127.700 extra hours worked over
one qualifciation period
Delta Extra Duty 04 58 8.397 23.911 -51.083 93.677 Difference between Extra
Duty 04 and 03
LOBE value 01 58 3.434 0.392 2.700 4.200 LOBE-Evaluation
02 58 3.336 0.279 2.900 4.100 at the end of a qualification
03 58 3.328 0.257 3.000 4.000 period 
04 58 3.356 0.267 2.600 4.000
LOBElag value 02 58 3.434 0.392 2.700 4.200 LOBE-Evaluation
03 58 3.336 0.279 2.900 4.100 of the last period (t-1)
04 58 3.328 0.257 3.000 4.000 (LOBElag02=LOBE01)
LOBElagdelta 03 58 -0.098 0.285 -0.900 0.400 Difference of last two LOBE
04 58 -0.009 0.183 -0.400 0.400 Eval.   (LOBElagdelta03
           = LOBE02-LOBE01)
posLOBElagdelta 03 58 0.043 0.090 0.000 0.307 The positive side of 
04 58 0.048 0.083 0.000 0.360 LOBElagdelta weighted by
its inverse prob. of appearance
negLOBElagdelta 03 58 0.047 0.080 0.000 0.385 The negative side of 
04 58 0.024 0.046 0.000 0.200 LOBElagdelta weighted by
its inverse prob. of appearance
posreci 03 58 8.879 2.798 0 10 The experimentaly measured
04 58 8.879 2.798 0 10 positive reciprocity
negreci 03 58 1.862 6.267 -10 10 The experimentaly measured
04 58 1.862 6.267 -10 10 negative reciprocity
posreci*posLOBElagdelta 03 58 0.407 0.861 0.000 3.072 Interaction term of
04 58 0.398 0.761 0.000 3.600 posreci with 
posLOBElagdelta
negreci*negLOBElagdelta 03 58 0.010 0.734 -3.846 2.040 Interaction term of
04 58 0.034 0.295 -1.071 1.166 negreci with
negLOBElagdelta
Wage bracket 03 58 24.190 1.721 17 28 The wage bracket a worker
04 58 24.759 1.261 24 29 belongs to
Notes:
Source: own calculations based on data provided by the Swiss Air Force.  
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Table 21: List of extra and normal duties. 
Normalduties Extraduties
Variablename Variablename Variablename Variablename
administration nightwayinstruktion ausbildunginglg lobe
aquila nightwaynichtfliegerisch ausbildungmfs luftfahrthindernisdienst
ausbildnerfluglehrer nomadeausbildung ausweiterbildung luftraumbewirtschaftung
auslandkampagnenressortluv nomadefliegerisch ausweiterbildungeigene lufttransportdienst
auslandkampagnenueg nomadeinstruktion flg1lw luftwaffexxi
avia nomadenichtfliegerisch flgtlgfdkfl81 lwseminar
axalp nomadfliegerisch teilnehmerinfgt mitarbeitinfachteams
bealwausstellunginbern nomadnichtfliegerisch weiterbildungskurse; nalouette3
besucheausstellungenallg norkaausbildung air04pay namraam
bmpsausbildung norkafliegerisch allgstabsarbkoor ndauswertung
bmpsinstruktion norkainstruktion anlssebesuche nderungsdienst
colibri norkanichtfliegerisch aocairoperationcenterjfacc ndo27dornier
comptoirsuisse2003 norkanomade arbeitenfrdivag neueirlwfll
condorusterdtruppe orgplanungflugbetrieb arbeitenfrskyguide nf5eftiger
crm patrouillesuisse assessment nfa18cdhornet
expo02werftlw pc7team ausbildungsgrundlagen nflzsimtiger
feuerlscheinstze pikettreadiness ausbildungskonzepte npc6
flgebetreuungmiliz simulatoreigenestraining auskunftsert npc7
flgezgdritterhelipt simulatorinstruktion banflugwinkelgert npc9
flgezgdritterlainkldo spesen bdatalinkfa18 npilotenausrstung
flgezgdritterltjetinklska sport bearbeitungvonmilanfmph nprojcbtth98
flgezgdritterltjetinklskaf spukspuginstruktion berichte nsimhoupdate
flgezgdritterluv subsidirereinsatz bersetzungen nska350c
flgezgdritterp7p9 takausinstruktion bflintefislw nsuperpumath89
flgezgdrltjetinklskaflieg tellit bflorako ntwinotter
flgezglt truppendiensttagestd bmehrzweckhelikopter oeffentlichesamtstd
flugdiensteigenestraining ttkwkflieger bmiltrspflz osze
flugdienstit uegfdekf bmppersonalfhrungplanung personaladministration
flugunfall uegflugdienstinstruktion bneueirlwfll personalbetreuung
flugveranstaltungen uplygone bpilotenausrstung personalfhrungberufsorg
jarinstruktionsflugd v112 bth98 personalplanungfhrung
jartraining v154 dialoginstruktoren personalplanungueg
laaged v211 dialoglobe pfp
ltjetvorbereitung v46 dienstleistungenfrdenstabkdt pilotenausrstung
lwosb v91 dienstleistungfrflbr31 posteinundausgang
meetingaarburg verschiedenes dlfraal projektelite
meetingaltenrhein03 wef2003 dlfrbaalw projektom
meetingaxalp03 wef2004 dlfrbablw projektsmds
meetingbadragaz03 wef2005 dlfrbr31 protokolle
meetingbarcelonae03 weitereauslandkampagnenrluv dlfrbr33 referatebeimilitrischenanlssen
meetingberlind04 worldeconomicforum dlfrdritteausserhalblw referatebeizivilenanlssen
meetingbernbelp04 bmps dlfrei reglementrmfd95
meetingbirrfeld04 pilausbberleben dlfreistablw remove
meetingbratislava04 pilausbflugda3 dlfrflbr31 sachbearbeitungflir
meetingcognacf04 pilausbflugdpc7 dlfrkdoueg85 sachbearbeitunglandestopograph
meetingdaxf04 pilausbflugdtiger dlfrlvbfl31 saradministration
meetingdecimomannui04 pilausbsat dlfrueg schiessleiterluftboden
meetingdittingen03 pilausbsras dlfrugop schiessleiterluftluft
meetingdiverserlw pilausbtheorie dlfrvorgesetzten schulunglkf
meetingemmen03 pilotenslw82 doktrinforschungundentwicklung sekretariatsarbeiten
meetingevianf04 pilrs doktrinverbreitung sitzungenrapporte
meetingfairfordgb04 pilsi eignungsabklrungfvs softwareentwicklung
meetinggenve04 pilsii eignungsabklrungpil softwareentwicklungfreigenenbed
meetinggruyre03 piluosi einsatzbosnieneufor stellungnahmen
meetingkoksijdeb03 piluosii einsatzkosovo stellungnahmenberichte
meetinglangenthal03 plsaffacapilwxxijar entwveinsatz stellvertretung
meetinglugano03 takausausbildung eufor superuser
meetingluganoagno03 ukfa18 fachdlk telefonausknfte
meetingpayerne03 ukth98 fachpublikationen tglicheopeinsatzleitungeinsatzo
meetingpayerne25403 umschulungen fas tglicheoperationeneinsatzleit
meetingpayerne260903 wau feuerlscheinsatzportugal04 truppenantrge
meetingrapperswil03 wsis03 fhrungorganisation truppenversuche
meetingraron03 fhrungsreglbsvorschr untersttzungoperationenlw
meetingsalondeprovencef03 fhrungssimulatoren upgrade21u21
meetingsamedan04 fislwfhrungssystem usersupport
meetingstmoritz flowflplkdo v143
meetingststephan04 flugdienstleitungcfo v172
meetingtwenthenl03 flugdienstleitunginklcfo v24
meetingverbier04 flugsicherheit v35
meetingvolkelnl04 flugsicherung v76
meetingvolketswil04 fotoundbildmaterial v77  
Source: own listing based on data provided by the Swiss Air Force. 
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